

References

- AKIBA, KEN [2004], "Vagueness in the World", *Noûs* 38: 407–29.
- BENACERRAF, P., and PUTNAM, H. [1983], *Philosophy of Mathematics*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- BOLOS, G. [1987], "The Consistency of Frege's *Foundations of Arithmetic*", in Judith Jarvis Thompson (ed.), *On Being and Saying: Essays for Richard Cartwright*, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT), 3–20; repr. in Boolos [1998], 183–201.
- [1995], "Quotational Ambiguity", in Paolo Leonardi and Marco Santambrogio (eds.), *On Quine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 283–96; repr. in Boolos [1998], 392–405.
- [1998], *Logic, Logic, and Logic* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
- BROUWER, L. E. J. [1912], *Intuitionisme en Formalisme* (Gronigen: Noordhoof); trans. as "Intuitionism and Formalism", Benacerraf and Putnam [1983], 77–89.
- [1948], "Consciousness, Philosophy and Mathematics", *Philosophy of Mathematics*, Benacerraf and Putnam [1983], 90–6.
- BURGESS, J. A., and HUMBERSTONE, I. L. [1987], "Natural Deduction Rules for a Logic of Vagueness", *Erkenntnis* 27: 197–229.
- BURNS, L. C. [1991], *Vagueness: An Investigation into Natural Languages and the Sorites Paradox* (Dordrecht: Kluwer).
- COFFA, A. [1991], *The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- COOK, R. T. [2000], "Logic-as-modeling: A New Perspective on Formalization", Ph.D. Dissertation, The Ohio State University.
- [2002], "Vagueness and Mathematical Precision", *Mind* 111: 225–47.
- COPELAND, B. JACK [1994], "On Vague Objects, Fuzzy Logic and Fractal Boundaries", *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 33, suppl.: 83–96.
- CORCORAN, J. [1973], "Gaps between Logical Theory and Mathematical Practice", in M. Bunge (ed.), *The Methodological Unity of Science* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel), 23–50.
- and Weaver, G. [1969], "Logical Consequence in Modal Logic I: Natural Deduction in S5", *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 10: 370–84.
- DAVIDSON, D. [1984], *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (Oxford, Clarendon).
- [1986], "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs", in Richard Grandy and Richard Warner (ed.), *Philosophical Grounds of Rationality* (Oxford, Oxford University Press), 157–74.
- and HARMAN, G. (eds.) [1972], *Semantics of Natural Language* (Dordrecht, D. Reidel).
- DUMMETT, M. [1973], "The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic", repr. in id., *Truth and Other Enigmas* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), 215–47; repr. in Benacerraf and Putnam [1983], 97–129.
- [1975], "Wang's Paradox", *Synthese* 30: 301–24; repr. in Keefe and Smith [1997], 99–118.
- [1991], *Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).

- DUMMETT, M. [2000], *Elements of Intuitionism*, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- EDGINGTON, D. [1992], "Validity, Uncertainty and Vagueness", *Analysis* 52: 193–204.
- [1997], "Vagueness by Degrees", in Keefe and Smith [1997], 294–316.
- EVANS, GARETH [1978], "Can there be Vague Objects?", *Analysis* 38: 208; repr. in Keefe and Smith [1997], 317.
- FINE, K. [1975], "Vagueness, Truth and Logic", *Synthese* 30: 265–300; repr. in Keefe and Smith [1997], 119–50.
- FODOR, J., and LEPORÉ, E. [1996], "What Cannot Be Evaluated Cannot Be Evaluated, and It Cannot Be Supervaluated Either", *Journal of Philosophy* 93: 513–35.
- FREGE, G. [1879], *Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens* (Halle: Louis Nebert), trans. in J. van Heijenoort (ed.), *From Frege to Gödel* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), 1–82.
- [1884], *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik* (Breslau: Koebner); *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, trans. J. Austin, 2nd edn. (New York: Harper, 1960).
- [1893], *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik I* (Hildesheim: Olms).
- GAIFMAN, HAIM [2005], "Vagueness, Tolerance and Contextual Logic" (forthcoming).
- GRAFF, DELIA [2000], "Shifting Sands: An Interest-Relative Theory of Vagueness", *Philosophical Topics* 28: 45–81.
- [2001], "Phenomenal Continua and the Sorites", *Mind* 110: 905–35.
- [2003], "Gap Principles, Penumbral Consequence, and Infinitely Higher-Order Vagueness", in J. C. Beall (ed.), *Liars and Heaps* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 195–221.
- GRICE, P., and STRAWSON, P. F. [1956], "In Defense of a Dogma", *Philosophical Review* 65: 141–58.
- HACKING, I. [1979], "What Is Logic?", *The Journal of Philosophy* 76: 285–319.
- HALE, BOB, and WRIGHT CRISPIN [2001], *The Reason's Proper Study* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- HODES, H. [1984], "Logicism and the Ontological Commitments of Arithmetic", *Journal of Philosophy* 81: 123–49.
- HORGAN, T. [1994a], "Robust Vagueness and the Forced-March Sorites Paradox", *Philosophical Perspectives* 8: *Logic and Language*, 159–88.
- [1994b], "Transvaluationism: A Dionysian Approach to Vagueness", *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 33, suppl.: 97–126.
- HYDE, DOMINIC [1997], "From Heaps and Gaps to Heaps of Gluts", *Mind* 106: 641–60.
- JESHION, ROBIN [2001], "Frege's Notions of Self-Evidence", *Mind* 110: 937–76.
- KAMP, HANS [1981], "The Paradox of the Heap", in U. Mönnich (ed.), *Aspects of Philosophical Logic* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel), 225–77.
- KEEFE, R. [2000], *Theories of Vagueness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- and SMITH, P. [1997], *Vagueness: A Reader* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT).
- KRAUT, R. [1992], "The Objectivity of Color and the Color of Objectivity", *Philosophical Studies* 68: 265–87.
- KRIPKE, S. [1965], "Semantical Analysis of Intuitionistic Logic I", in J. Crossley and M. Dummett (eds.), *Formal Systems and Recursive Functions* (Amsterdam: North Holland), 92–130.

- LEWIS, D. [1969], *Convention* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
- [1970], "General Semantics", *Synthese* 22: 18–67.
- [1975], "Languages and Language", *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science* 7, ed. K. Gunderson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 3–35.
- [1979], "Scorekeeping in a Language Game", *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 8: 339–59.
- [1986], *On the Plurality of Worlds* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).
- [1988], "Vague Identity: Evans Misunderstood", *Analysis* 48: 128–30; repr. in Keefe and Smith [1997], 318–20.
- LYCAN, W. [1984], *Logical Form in Natural Language* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT).
- MACHINA, K. F. [1976], "Truth, Belief and Vagueness", *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 5: 47–78; repr. in Keefe and Smith [1997], 174–203.
- MCCARTY, C., and TENNANT, N. [1987], "Skolem's Paradox and Constructivism", *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 16: 165–202.
- MCGEE, VANN [1991], *Truth, Vagueness, and Paradox* (Indianapolis: Hackett).
- and McLAUGHLIN, B. [1994], "Distinctions Without a Difference", *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 33, suppl.: 203–51.
- MERRICKS, TRENTON [2001], "Varieties of Vagueness", *Philosophical and Phenomenological Research* 62: 145–57.
- MONTAGUE, R. [1974], R. Thomason (ed.), *Formal Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale University Press).
- MORREAU, MICHAEL [2002], "What Vague Objects Are Like", *Journal of Philosophy* 99: 333–61.
- PARSONS, C. [1990], "The Structuralist View of Mathematical Objects", *Synthese* 84: 303–46.
- PARSONS, TERRENCE, and WOODRUFF, PETER [1995], "Worldly Indeterminacy of Identity", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 95: 171–91; repr. in Keefe and Smith [1997], 321–37.
- PRIEST, G. [1987], *In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff).
- PUTNAM, H. [1981], *Reason, Truth and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- QUINE, W. V. O. [1951], "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", *Philosophical Review* 60: 20–43.
- [1960], *Word and Object* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT).
- [1981], "What Price Bivalence", *Journal of Philosophy* 78: 90–5.
- [1986], *Philosophy of Logic*, 2nd edn. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall).
- RAFFMAN, D. [1994], "Vagueness Without Paradox", *Philosophical Review* 103: 41–74.
- [1996], "Vagueness and Context Relativity", *Philosophical Studies* 81: 175–92.
- [2005], "Borderline Cases and Bivalence", *Philosophical Review* (forthcoming).
- ROSEN, GIDEON, and SMITH, NICHOLAS, J. J. [2004], "Worldly Indeterminacy: A Rough Guide", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 82: 185–98.
- SAINSBURY, R. M. [1988], *Paradoxes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- [1990], "Concepts Without Boundaries", Inaugural Lecture, published by the King's College London, Department of Philosophy; reprinted in Keefe and Smith [1997], 251–64.
- [1994], "Why the World Cannot Be Vague", *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 33, suppl.: 63–81.

- SÁNCHEZ-MIGUEL, M. [1993], "The Grounds of the Model-Theoretic Account of the Logical Properties", *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 34: 107–31.
- SANFORD, D. H. [1976], "Competing Semantics for Vagueness: Many Values versus Super-Truth", *Synthese* 33: 195–210.
- SHAPIRO, S. [1988], "The Lindenbaum Construction and Decidability", *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 29: 208–13.
- [1998], "Logical Consequence: Models and Modality", in M. Schirn (ed.), *The Philosophy of Mathematics Today* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 131–56.
- [2001], "Modeling and Normativity: How Much Revisionism Can We Take?", *Agora* 20: 159–73.
- SOAMES, SCOTT [1999], *Understanding Truth* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- SORENSEN, R. [1988], *Blindspots* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- [2001], *Vagueness and Contradiction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- STALNAKER, ROBERT C. [1999], *Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- TAPPENDEN, J. [1993], "The Liar and Sorites Paradoxes: Toward a Unified Treatment", *Journal of Philosophy* 90: 551–77.
- TENNANT, N. [1987], *Anti-realism and Logic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- TYE, M. [1989], "Supervaluationism and the Law of Excluded Middle", *Analysis* 49: 141–3.
- [1994], "Sorites Paradoxes and the Semantics of Vagueness", *Philosophical Perspectives* 8: *Logic and Language*, 189–206; repr. in Keefe and Smith [1997], 281–93.
- UNGER, P. [1975], *Ignorance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- UZQUIANO, GABRIEL [2004], "The Supreme Court and the Supreme Court Justices: A Metaphysical Puzzle", *Noûs* 38: 135–53.
- WAISMANN, FRIEDRICH [1949], "Analytic-Synthetic I", *Analysis* 10: 25–40.
- [1950], "Analytic-Synthetic II", *Analysis* 11: 25–38.
- [1951a], "Analytic-Synthetic III", *Analysis* 11: 49–61.
- [1951b], "Analytic-Synthetic IV", *Analysis* 11: 115–24.
- [1952], "Analytic-Synthetic V", *Analysis* 13: 1–14.
- [1953], "Analytic-Synthetic VI", *Analysis* 13: 73–89.
- [1968], "Verifiability", in Antony Flew (ed.), *Logic and Language* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).
- WILLIAMSON, T. [1994], *Vagueness* (London: Routledge).
- [1999], "On the Structure of Higher-Order Vagueness", *Mind* 108: 127–43.
- WRIGHT, C. [1976], "Language Mastery and the Sorites Paradox", in G. Evans and J. McDowell (eds.), *Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 223–47; repr. in Keefe and Smith [1997], 151–73.
- [1983], *Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects* (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press).
- [1987], "Further Reflections on the Sorites Paradox", *Philosophical Topics* 15: 227–90; repr. in Keefe and Smith [1997], 204–50.
- [1992], *Truth and Objectivity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).

Brouwer, L. E. J. 120

Brouwer, Vol. 3, 12, 17, 18, 21, 27, 33, 45, 76

91, 125, 127, 134, 139, 149, 157, 169,

178, 205, 206