its dispositions to behaviour, whether by observation or by using a predictive or simulative device (Grush 2004). And they manage the system by making interventions that correct for ways in which it may be disposed to act out of rational type.

The lesson of this discussion is that in more or less standard conditions a collectively rational and individually responsive group agent will have to be self-governing rather than self-organizing. This lesson holds, more specifically, for conditions where logically connected issues present themselves for resolution, rational agency requires a complete, consistent set of answers, and it is important that those answers are rationally sensitive to the overall evidence available. Whether it has an assembly or a network character, the group agent will have to organize itself for such conditions so that some or all of its members can keep track of its accumulating judgements and take steps to guard against the onset of inconsistency. The lesson may not have the full-dress credentials of an a priori necessity but it is as safe a bet as we are likely to be able to identify in this area.

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