LITERATURA

Armstrong, D. (1983). *What Is a Law of Nature?* Cambridge University Press.

Austin, J. L. (1950). Truth. *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume*, 24(1), 111–129.

Belnap, N. (1977). How a Computer Should Think. In: G. Ryle (ed.), *Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy*, Stocksfield: Oriel Press Ltd., 30–55.

Bielik, L. (2007). Hempelove kritériá explanácie v kontexte modelu historickej explanácie. *Organon F, 14*(4), 498–517.

— (2011). Testovateľnosť a význam observačných a teoretických termínov. *Organon F, 18*(3), 384–397.

— (2012). Abduktívny model (vedeckého) vysvetlenia. *Organon F, 19*(1), 5–19.

Bielik, L., Gahér, F., Zouhar, M. (2010). O definíciách a definovaní. *Filozofia*, 65(8), 719–737.

Borges, J. L. (1989). *Zrcadlo a maska.* Praha: Odeon.

Carnap, R. (1936). Testability and Meaning. *Philosophy of Science, 3*(4), 419–471.

— (1937). Testability and Meaning – Continued. *Philosophy of Science, 4*(1), 1–40.

— (1950). *Logical Foundations of Probability.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

— (1958). *Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic.* (Second Edition.) Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (Phoenic Edition).

— (1966). *Philosophical Foundations of Physics.* New York, London: Basic Books, Inc.

Cmorej, P. (2001). K intenzionálnej analýze problémov, ich riešení a k typológii. *Na pomedzí logiky a filozofie.* Bratislava: Veda, 172–194.

— (2005). Semivýrazy a výrazy. In: P. Sousedík (ed.), *Jazyk – logika – věda*, Praha: Filosofia, 63–88.

Cresswell, M. J. (1985). *Structured Meanings.* Cambridge (Mass): MIT Press, London: A Bradford Book.

Dolák, A. (2013). *Wittgenstein I.: Ontologie.* Brno: Institut mezioborových studií.

Duží, M., Jespersen, B., Materna, P. (2010). *Procedural Semantics for Hyperintensional Logic: Foundations and Applications of Transparent Intensional Logic*. Springer Verlag.

Duží, M., Materna, P. (2012). *TIL jako procedurální logika. Průvodce zvídavého čtenáře Transparentní intensionální logikou*. Bratislava: Aleph.

Feferman, S. (1984). Towards Useful Type-Free Theories. I. *The Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 49, 75–111.

Field, H. (2008). *Saving Truth from Paradox*. Oxford University Press.

Fraassen, B. C. van (1969). Facts and Tautological Entailments. *Journal of Philosophy*, 66(15), 477–487.

— (1980). *The Scientific Image*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Frege, G. (1891). *Function und Begriff*. Jena: Verlag von Hermann Pohle, 1–31.

— (1884). *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik: eine logisch-mathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff der Zahl*. Breslau: W. Koebner.

— (1892). Über Sinn und Bedeutung. *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik* 100, 25–50.

— (1893/1903). *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*. Jena: Verlag Hermann Pohle.

— (1914). Logik in der Mathematik. Přeloženo jako „Logic in mathematics" in H. Hermes *et al.* (eds.). *Posthumous Writings*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1979.

— (1918/1956). The Thought: A Logical Inquiry. *Mind*, 65(259), 289–311.

Gödel, K. (1944). Russell's Mathematical Logic. In: Schilpp, P. A. (ed.), *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, Evanston, Chicago: Northwestern University, 125–153.

Goodman, N. (1955/1983). *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast* (fourth edition). Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press.

Gupta, A., Belnap, N. (1993). *The Revision Theory of Truth*. Cambridge (Mass.): A Bradford Book.

Halbach, V. (2011). *Axiomatic Theories of Truth*. Cambridge University Press.

Halvorson, H. (2012). What Scientific Theories Could Not Be. *Philosophy of Science*, 79(2), 183–206.

Hanzel, I. (1999). *The Concept of Scientific Law in the Philosophy of Science and Epistemology*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

— (2008). Scientific Laws and Scientific Explanations: A Differentiated Typology. *Organon F*, 15(3), 323–344.

— (2009). The Development of Carnap's Semantics. *The American Journal of Semiotics*, 25(1–2), 123–151.

— (2010). Vedecká explanácia, význam a kontext. In: M. Zouhar (ed.), *Kontext a význam*. Bratislava: Aleph, 107–115.

— (2010a). *Studies in the Methodology of Natural and Social Sciences*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag.

Havlík, V. (2004). Problém interpretace vědecké teorie. In: M. Zouhar (ed.), *Používanie, interpretácia a význam jazykových výrazov*. Bratislava: Veda, 179–191.

Hempel, C. G. (1952). *Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science*. Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press.

Hilbert, D., Bernays, P. (1939/1970). *Grundlagen der Mathematik*. Heidelberg, Berlin: Springer Verlag.

Hornsby, J. (1997). Truth: The Identity Theory. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 47, 1–24.

Church, A. (1940). A Formulation of the Simple Theory of Types. *The Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 5(2), 56–68.

— (1946). A Note on the "Paradox of Analysis." by Morton G. White; The "Paradox of Analysis" Again: A Reply by Max Black; Analysis and Identity: A Rejoinder by Morton G. White; How can Analysis be Informative? by Max Black. *The Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 11(4), 132–133.

— (1951). The Need for Abstract Entities in Semantic Analysis. *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Science*, 80(1), 100–112.

— (1956). *Introduction to Mathematical Logic*. Vol. I, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

— (1976). A Comparison of Russell's Resolution of the Semantical Antinomies with that of Tarski. *The Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 41(4), 747–760.

Jastrzembská, Z. (2009). *Aspekty vysvětlení: hledání explanačních znalostí*. Olomouc: Nakladatelství Olomouc.

Kemeny, J. G. (1951). Review of R. Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability. *The Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 16, 205–207.

Kitcher, P., Salmon, W. (1987): Van Fraassen on Explanation. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 84, 315–330.

Kleene, S. C. (1967). *Mathematical Logic*. John Wiley.

Kneale, W. C. (1950). Natural Laws and Contrary-to-fact Conditionals. *Analysis*, 10, 121–125.

Kolář, P. (2003). *Pravda a fakt*. Praha: Filosofia.

Kripke, S. (1975). Outline of a Theory of Truth. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 72(19), 690–716.

— (1972/1980). *Naming and Necessity*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Kuhn, T. S. (1962). *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Kuchyňka, P. (2012). *Pravidla, jazyk a logika*. Dizertace, Brno: Masarykova univerzita.

Kuipers, T. A. F. (ed.) (1987). *What is Closer-to-Truth*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Langford, C. H. (1942). Moore's Notion of Analysis. In: P. A. Schilpp (ed.). *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 321–342.

Lewis, C. I. (1923). Facts, Systems, and the Unity of the World. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 20(6), 141–151.

Lewis, D. (1970). General Semantics. *Synthèse*, 22(1–2), 18–67.

— (1975). Languages and Language. In: K. Gunderson (ed.), *Language, Mind and Knowledge. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science* 7, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 3–35.

— (1986). *Philosophical Papers II*. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

— (1994). Humean Supervenience Debugged. *Mind*, 104(412), 473–490.

Łukasiewicz, J. (1970). *Selected Works*. L. Borkowski (ed.), Amsterdam: North-Holland, Warsaw: PWN.

Materna, P. (1999). "Indirect Correspondence Theory of Truth" Vindicated. In: *The Logica Yearbook 1998*, Praha: Filosofia, 36–49.

— (2004). *Conceptual Systems*. Berlin: Logos.

— (2008). The Notion of Problem, Intuitionism and Partiality. *Logic and Logical Philosophy*, 17, 287–303.

— (2013). Equivalence of Problems (An Attemptat an Explication of Problem). *Axiomathes*, 23, 617–631.

Miller, D. (1974). Popper's Qualitative Theory of Verisimilitude. *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 25(2), 166–177.

— (1976). Verisimilitude Redeflated. *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 27(4), 363–381.

— (2007). *Out of Error*. London: Ashgate.

— (2008). Not Much Has Changed. A Rejoinder to Raclavský. *Organon F*, 15(2), 178–190.

Mitchell, T. M. (1997). *Machine Learning*. McGraw-Hill.

Montague, R. (1974). *Formal Philosophy*. New Haven, London: Yale University Press.

Moore, G. E. (1899). The Nature of Judgment. *Mind*, 8(30), 176–193.

Neale, S. (1995). The Philosophical Significance of Gödel's Slingshot. *Mind*, 104(416), 761–825.

Niiniluoto, I. (1987). *Truthlikeness*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Neurath, O. (1932/33). Protokollsätze. *Erkenntnis*, 3(1), 204–214.

Oddie, G. (1986). *Likeness to Truth*. Dordrecht: Riedel.

— (1987). The Picture Theory of Truthlikeness. In: T.A.F. Kuipers (ed.), *What is Closer-to-the-Truth?*, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 25–45.

— (2007). Truthlikeness. In: E. N. Zalta (ed.), *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2008 Edition), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008 /entries/truthlikeness/>.

Oddie, G., Tichý, P. (1982). The Logic of Ability, Freedom, and Responsibility. *Studia Logica*, 41(2–3), 227–248.

Popper, K. R. (1963). *Conjectures and Refutations*. London, New York: Routledge.

Priest, G. (1987/2006). *In Contradiction. A Study of the Transconsistent*. Oxford University Press.

Putnam, H. (1973). Meaning and Reference. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 70(19), 699–711.

— (1975). The Meaning of 'Meaning'. *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, 7, 131–193.

Quine, W. V. O. (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. *Philosophical Review, 60,* 20–43.

— (1968). Ontological Relativity. *The Journal of Philosophy,* 65(7), 185–212.

— (1960). *Word and Object.* Cambridge (Mass.): The MIT Press.

— (1970). On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation. *The Journal of Philosophy, 67,* 178–183.

— (1987). Indeterminacy of Translation Again. *The Journal of Philosophy, 84,* 5–10.

Raclavský, J. (2006). Zrevidování pojmu jazykového faktu (Definice pojmového faktu). *Organon F,* 13(4), 524–534.

— (2007). Conceptual Dependence of Verisimilitude (Against Miller's Translation Invariance Demand). *Organon F,* 14(3), 334–353.

— (2007a). The Procedural Conception of Language and Fact. In: J. Šuch, M. Taliga (eds.), *Problém hraníc medzi filozofiou, umením a vedou,* Banská Bystrica: Univerzita Mateja Bela, 137–146.

— (2008). Conceptual Dependence of Verisimilitude Vindicated. A Farewell to Miller's Argument. *Organon F,* 15(3), 369–382.

— (2008a). Miller's and Taliga's Fallacies about Verisimilitude Counting. *Organon F,* 15(4), 477–484.

— (2009). *Jména a deskripce: logicko-sémantická zkoumání.* Olomouc: Nakladatelství Olomouc.

— (2009a). Lhářský paradox, význam a pravdivost. *Filosofický časopis,* 57(3), 325–351.

— (2009b). Structured Language Meanings and Structured Possible Worlds. In: V. A. Munz, K. Puhl, J. Wang (eds.), *Language and the World.* Wien: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 349–350.

— (2010). On Partiality and Tichý's Transparent Intensional Logic. *Hungarian Philosophical Review,* 54(4), 120–128.

— (2010a). Je paradox holiče paradoxem? *Pro-fil,* 12(2), 3–10, http://www.phil.muni.cz/journals/ index.php/profil/article/view/246.

— (2011). *Individua a jejich vlastnosti: studie z intenzionální metafyziky.* Olomouc: Nakladatelství Olomouc.

— (2012). Semantic Paradoxes and Transparent Intensional Logic. In: M. Peliš, V. Punčochář (eds.), *The Logica Yearbook 2011,* London: College Publications, 239–252.

— (2012a). Základy explikace sémantických pojmů. *Organon F,* 19(4), 488–505.

— (2013). Explikace a dedukce: od jednoduché k rozvětvené teorii typů. *Organon F,* 20 (Supplementary Issue 2), 37–53.

— (2014). Explicating Truth in Transparent Intensional Logic. In: R. Ciuni, H. Wansing, C. Willkomen (eds.), *Recent Trends in Philosophical Logic,* 41, Springer Verlag, 169–179.

— (2014a). On Interaction of Semantics and Deduction in Transparent Intensional Logic (Is Tichý's Logic a Logic?). *Logic and Logical Philosophy,* 23(1), 57–68.

Raclavský, J., Kuchyňka, P. (2011). Conceptual and Derivation Systems. *Logic and Logical Philosophy,* 20(1–2), 159–174.

Ramsey, F. P. (1927). Facts and Propositions. *Aristotelian Society Supplementary,* 7, 153–170.

Russell, B. (1903/2006). *Principles of Mathematics.* Cambridge University Press.

— (1905). On Denoting. *Mind,* 14(56), 479–493.

— (1908). Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types. *American Journal of Mathematics,* 30(3), 222–262.

— (1918–1919/2010). *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism.* London, New York: Routledge.

Sarkar, S., Pfeifer, J. (eds.) (2006). *The Philosophy of Science. An Encyclopedia.* London, New York: Routledge.

Shramko, Y., Wansing, H. (2011). *Truth and Falsehood: An Inquiry into Generalized Logical Values.* Springer.

Schlick, M. (1932). The Future of Philosophy. In: *College of Pacific Publications in Philosophy I,* Stockton, 45–62.

Strawson, P. F. (1950). On Referring. *Mind,* 59(235), 320–344.

— (1950a). Truth. *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume,* 24, 129–156.

Taliga, M. (2008). Why Verisimilitude Should Not Be Dependent on Conceptual Systems. *Organon F,* 15(2), 191–205.

Tarski, A. (1933/1956). The Notion of Truth in Formalized Languages. In: *Logic, Semantics and Metamathematics,* Oxford University Press, 152–278.

— (1944). The Semantic Conception of Truth: and the Foundations of Semantics. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4*(3), 341–376.

Tichý, J., Tichý, P. (1999). On Inference. In: T. Childers (ed.), *The Logica Yearbook 1998*, Praha, Filosofia, 73–85.

Tichý, P. (1966). K explikaci pojmu obsah věty. *Filosofický časopis, 14*, 364–372.

— (1968). Smysl a procedura. *Filosofický časopis, 16*, 222–232.

— (1971). An Approach to Intensional Analysis. *Noûs, 5*(3), 273–297.

— (1974). On Popper's Definitions of Verisimilitude. *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 25*(2), 155–188.

— (1976). *Introduction to Intensional Logic.* Nepublikovaný manuskript knihy.

— (1976a). Verisimilitude Redefined. *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 27*(1), 25–42.

— (1978). Verisimilitude Revisited. *Synthèse, 38*(2), 175–196.

— (1978a). A New Theory of Subjunctive Conditionals. *Synthèse, 37*(3), 433–457.

— (1978b). Questions, Answers, and Logic. *American Philosophical Quarterly, 15*(4), 275–284.

— (1980). The Semantics of Episodic Verbs. *Theoretical Linguistics, 7*(3), 264–296.

— (1982). Foundations of Partial Type Theory. *Reports on Mathematical Logic, 14*, 57–72.

— (1986). Indiscernibility of Identicals. *Studia Logica, 45*(3), 257–273.

— (1986). Constructions. *Philosophy of Science, 53*(4), 514–534.

— (1988). *The Foundations of Frege's Logic.* Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter.

— (1994). The *Tractatus* in the Light of Intensional Logic. *From the Logical Point of View, 3*(2), 32–41.

— (1994). The Analysis of Natural Language. *From the Logical Point of View, 3*(2), 42–80.

— (2004). *Pavel Tichý's Collected Papers in Logic and Philosophy.* Svoboda, V., Jespersen, B., Cheyne, C. (eds.), Dunedin: University of Otago Publisher, Prague: Filosofia.

Tichý, P., Oddie, G. (1983). Ability and Freedom. *American Philosophical Quarterly, 20*(2), 135–147.

Tooley, M. (1987). *Causation.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Turing, A. (1936). On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem. *Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society.* (Series 2) *42*, 230–265.

Vacek, M. (2013). Impossibilists' Paradise on the Cheap? *Organon F, 20*(3), 283–301.

Wisdom, J. (1933). Logical Constructions (V.) *Mind, New Series, 42*(166), 186–202.

Whitehead, A. N., Russell, B. (1910–1913). *Principia Mathematica.* Cambridge University Press.

Wittgenstein, L. (1918/1964). *Tractatus logico-philosophicus.* Suhrkamp: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Zeleňák, E. (2008). *Moderné teórie vysvetlenia a príčinnosti.* Ružomberok: Katolícka univerzita v Ružomberku.

Zouhar, M. (2006). *Rigidná designácia.* Bratislava: Info Press