

critique, see Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker, “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap,” and Block, “The Harder Problem of Consciousness.” Other discussions include David Papineau, *Thinking About Consciousness*, and John Perry, *Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness*. Both Papineau and Perry defend physicalism against well-known objections, like the zombie argument and the knowledge argument. Daniel Stoljar’s *Physicalism* is a readable up-to-date survey, analysis, and discussion.

The Waning of Materialism, edited by Robert C. Koons and George Bealer, is a recent anthology of new essays critical of the materialist-physicalist paradigm.

There is a large literature on the knowledge argument. Two collections of essays are worth examining: *There’s Something About Mary*, edited by Peter Ludlow et al., and *Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge*, edited by Torin Alter and Sven Walter.

The Case for Qualia, edited by Edmond Wright, collects recent essays defending qualia against the deflationist-eliminativist stance taken by many contemporary philosophers.

On qualia epiphenomenalism, see Frank Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” and Jaegwon Kim, *Physicalism, or Something Near Enough*, chapter 6. The latter presents in greater detail the overall picture described in the last section of this chapter. *The Conscious Mind* by David Chalmers presents a similar picture.

NOTES

1. This term is due to W. V. Quine.
2. Note that there can be multiple supervenience bases for a mental state. N may be the supervenience of pain for you, but as we have seen with the multiple realizability of mental states (chapter 5), a different neural state may be pain’s supervenience base for octopuses, still another for reptiles, and so on.
3. The term “explanatory gap” was introduced by Joseph Levine in his “Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap.” The issue of explaining mind-body supervenience relations is highlighted in Terence Horgan, “From Supervenience to Superdupervenience.”
4. This formulation of the question is Ned Block’s.
5. William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, p. 647 in the 1981 reprint edition.
6. T. H. Huxley, *Lessons in Elementary Physiology*, p. 202.
7. David Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind*, p. 24.
8. Such scanning devices must ultimately be neural organs. If so, it is at least conceivable that your scanning system gets hooked up with my brain so

that it monitors my first-order mental states, and conversely that my internal scanner is wired to your brain to monitor your first-order states. In this situation, would you be conscious of my mental states, and I of yours? Does this even make sense? If the internal monitoring account of consciousness implies this to be a possible situation, that might be a sign that there is something deeply wrong with the account.

9. Saul Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, pp. 153–154. The target of Kripke's argument is the identification of pain with C-fiber stimulation; however, his argument applies with equal force against the supervenience of pain on C-fiber stimulation.

10. This is based on Ned Block's "Inverted Earth."

11. Arthur Rimbaud, "Voyelles." The phenomenon of synesthesia, in which a person, for example, hears sounds when she sees motion, makes it easier to imagine inverted sense modalities.

12. For complexities and complications in the supposition of inverted spectra, see C. L. Hardin, *Color for Philosophers*. See also Sydney Shoemaker, "Absent Qualia Are Impossible: A Reply to Block" and "The Inverted Spectrum"; and Michael Tye, "Qualia, Content, and the Inverted Spectrum."

13. This point is discussed in connection with functionalism; see chapter 5.

14. It is consistent to hold the supervenience of qualia on physical properties but deny their supervenience on functional properties. We might, for example, hold that qualia arise out of biological processes and that there is no reason to think that qualia are experienced by an electromechanical system (say, a robot) that is functionally indistinguishable from us.

15. There has been an active and wide-ranging debate over the relationship between conceivability and real possibility. The collection *Conceivability and Possibility*, ed. Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne, includes a number of interesting papers on the topic (including a comprehensive introduction).

16. We saw two advocates of this option in the preceding chapter, Daniel Dennett and Georges Rey.

17. Jerry Fodor writes, "If mind/body supervenience goes, the intelligibility of mental causation goes with it," *Psychosemantics*, p. 42. See Terence Horgan, "Supervenient Qualia," for a causal argument for qualia supervenience.

18. David Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind*, p. 43. Emphasis in original.

19. Jerry A. Fodor, "Special Sciences, or the Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis," in *Philosophy in Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings*, ed. David J. Chalmers, p. 131.

20. For more details on scientific explanation, see Carl G. Hempel, *Philosophy of Natural Science*.

21. Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker, "Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap," p. 24.

22. The derivation of this line is by a logical rule called "conditionalization," whereby a premise is "discharged" by making it the antecedent of an "if . . . then" statement with the last proved conclusion as the consequent.

23. To derive a full "iff" correlation, we also need to derive "*x* is in Cfs state" from "*x* is in pain." The reader might want to try such a derivation.

24. Christopher Hill, *Consciousness*, chapter 6. Hill also offers another physical theory of pain, the somatosensory theory, according to which pains are somatosensory representations of bodily disturbances, though the bodily disturbance theory remains his preferred option. For details and defense of the bodily disturbance account, the reader should turn to Hill's presentation and discussion in his book.

25. There are people who are congenitally incapable of experiencing pain. They have great difficulty coping with their surroundings without injuring themselves, and most of them do not live to adulthood.

26. The term "spandrel effect" was introduced by the evolutionary biologists Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin.

27. This example is drawn from Frank Jackson, "Epiphenomenal Qualia."

28. One good way of getting a sense of what's going on in consciousness research is to visit the Web site of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (ASSC) and download the program of a recent annual conference. The programs have a list of lectures, symposia, and contributed papers with informative abstracts.

29. In a recent book, *Mind and Consciousness: 5 Questions*, ed. Patrick Grim, twenty prominent philosophers of mind are asked the question "Is a science of consciousness possible?" Several philosophers give an unqualified "yes, of course" answer; almost all give affirmative answers, and no one a flat-out no answer. However, many of the respondents may have had in mind access consciousness, not phenomenal consciousness.

30. Frank Jackson, "Epiphenomenal Qualia." The quoted paragraphs are from p. 765 of *Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology*, ed. John Heil.

31. On recognitional concepts, see Brian Loar, "Phenomenal States," in *The Nature of Consciousness*, ed. Block, Flanagan, and Güzeldere, pp. 600ff.

32. See Lawrence Nemirow, "So *This* Is What It's Like: A Defense of the Ability Hypothesis"; David Lewis, "What Experience Teaches."

33. How about the proposition "Tomatoes don't look like lemons"? Is this a piece of new, demonstrative-free information that Mary can gain on her release? No, this is something Mary could know in her black-and-white room.

She knew all about the wavelengths of reflected light from tomatoes and lemons and how these wavelengths correspond to the different visual looks of objects. She only lacked knowledge of what it is like to visually experience these looks and how they differ from each other.

34. Jackson himself has renounced the knowledge argument. He now embraces a more physicalist-friendly stance; see his "The Knowledge Argument, Diaphanousness, Representationalism."

35. But what of the causal powers of pain as such—that is, as a mental kind? Strictly speaking, causation is a relation between instances of properties—that is, individual events and states—not between properties. This means that once we have vindicated the causal efficacy of each instance of a mental property, there is no further issue of vindicating the causal efficacy of the property "as such." Because mental kinds and properties are subject to multiple realization, we have to expect mental kinds to be highly causally heterogeneous, and we cannot identify the causal powers of a mental property or kind with those of any single physical property or kind. For more details, see Jaegwon Kim, "Reduction and Reductive Explanation: Is One Possible Without the Other?"

36. See David J. Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind*; Jaegwon Kim, *Physicalism, or Something Near Enough*.

37. In fact, the question of metaphysical possibility may well be irrelevant here. Since the issue is the definability of mental terms, it is a conceptual issue, and the conceivability of spectrum inversion suffices to show the indefinability of color qualia in behavioral-functional terms.

38. This was discussed earlier, in connection with qualia supervenience.

39. Note that we have only produced reasons for being unpersuaded by these arguments for identity reduction of qualia; we have not shown that identity reduction cannot work. (See note 40 on qualia and multiple realization.) This opens up an intriguing possibility: Intentional-cognitive states are reduced by functional reduction and qualia are reduced by identity reduction. This would cover all of mentality, and we would be home free! However, we must set aside further discussion of this strategy.

40. Doesn't the multiple realization argument actually defeat the identity reduction of qualia? Although Hilary Putnam used the case of pain to formulate his multiple realization argument (chapter 4), the argument works best for intentional-cognitive states. It is not implausible to link qualia closely to their neural-biological bases and deny their multiple realizability. See Christopher Hill, *Consciousness*, pp. 30–31.

41. Jerry A. Fodor, "Making Mind Matter More," in Fodor, *A Theory of Content and Other Essays*, p. 156.

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