

Contents

Editorial	5
Preface	7
1 Evolutionary game theory	9
1.1 The Hawk-Dove game	9
1.2 Darwinian vs. group selection	11
1.3 Normal form games	12
1.3.1 Fitness for mixed strategies	12
1.3.2 The Nash equilibrium	13
1.4 Evolutionary stable strategies	15
1.4.1 Analysis of two-player games with two strategies.	18
1.4.2 The rock-scissors-paper game	19
1.5 The habitat selection game	20
1.5.1 Patch payoff is a linear function	21
1.5.2 Parker's matching principle	22
1.6 Replicator dynamics	23
1.7 Dispersal dynamics	29
1.7.1 The best response dynamics	31
1.7.2 Better response dynamics	34
1.7.3 Continuous dynamics	36
1.7.4 Suboptimal dispersal	36
1.7.5 Dispersal of lady beetles	38
1.8 Games with a continuum of strategies.	42
1.9 Asymmetric games	44
1.9.1 The habitat selection game for competing species	47
1.9.2 Two-patch predator-prey systems	49
1.10 Optimal diet selection model	51
2 The effects of adaptive behavior on population dynamics	55
2.1 The habitat selection game for a growing population	55
2.2 The Lotka-Volterra predator-prey model	57
2.3 The Lotka-Volterra model with foraging-predation risk trade-offs	60
2.3.1 Adaptive predators	61
2.3.2 Adaptive prey	63
2.3.3 Both species are adaptive	64
2.4 The functional response	67
2.5 Effects of functional and numerical responses on prey-predator stability	70
2.5.1 Prey growth is density independent	71

2.5.2	Prey growth is density dependent	74
2.5.3	Effects of the optimal diet choice on predator-prey dynamics	76
2.6	Patchy environments	78
2.7	Models of competition	80
2.7.1	Lotka-Volterra model of competition	81
2.7.2	Two species competing in two patches	83
2.7.3	Exploitation competition.	85
2.7.4	Apparent competition	87
2.7.5	Parker's matching principle when resources undergo population dynamics	87
2.7.6	Apparent competition when consumers are adaptive foragers	88
2.8	Both consumers and predators behave adaptively	92
2.9	APPENDIX: Existence and uniqueness of Filippov solutions	93

Bibliography

95