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## *The Trinity*

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### *Book I*

#### The Absolute Equality of the Divine Persons

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More applications of the rule of interpretation that the Son is equal to the Father in the form of God, less than the Father in the form of man; the proposal of another complementary rule whereby some apparently subordinationist texts are interpreted as saying that the Son in his equality with the Father is yet from the Father; and of yet a third rule whereby, because of the unity of person in Jesus Christ, things are said of him in one nature which are in fact proper to him in virtue of the other; so that we can say, on the one hand that the Son of God was crucified, and on the other that the Son of man will judge the living and the dead.	

### *Book II*

#### Missions: Old Testament Theophanies

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Of the principle of interpretation whereby some texts are referred neither to the Son's equality with the Father, nor to his being less than the Father in the form of a servant, but	



simply to his being, in his co-eternal equality, from the Father; with discussion in support of this principle of some of the things that are said about the Holy Spirit.

Chapter 2 . . . . . 101

In which the author begins to discuss the significance of the missions, the sendings of the Son and of the Holy Spirit; first arguing that to talk of their being sent does not jeopardize their equality with the Father; then proposing a preliminary definition or description of mission as the visible manifestation in time of these two divine persons; finally pointing out the crucial difference between the permanent visible manifestation of the Son in the flesh, and the transient visible manifestation of the Spirit in the forms of a dove, a gust of wind, and tongues of fire. It must be borne in mind by the reader that this discussion of the missions is subordinated to the argument of the previous chapter, although only toward the end of Book IV will the author explicitly define the missions as revealing in time the eternal processions of the divine persons, thus formally including the language of mission under the rule he has elaborated in chapter 1, as language which shows that the Son is from the Father and the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son. The involvement of mission with visible manifestation raises a series of problems which have to be solved before that final definition can be achieved.

Chapter 3 . . . . . 109

In which the author broaches the problems raised by his preliminary definition of mission, in the last chapter, as the visible manifestation of the person sent; dividing them into three groups of questions: i) which, if any, of the divine persons in particular were manifested in each of the Old Testament theophanies—this he will deal with in the remainder of this book; ii) how the visible manifestations in those theophanies were managed, whether by the agency of angels or no—this will form the subject of Book III; and iii) whether we can properly talk of the sending of the Son and the Holy Spirit before their visible manifestations in the New Testament—this will be settled in Book IV. Before going on, in the next chapter, to discuss the first group of questions, he turns aside to demolish a basic assumption of much of the cruder “economic” theology, that the Son is the essentially visible member of the trinity, while the Father alone has immortality and dwells in light inaccessible, whom no man has seen or can see, and is alone the invisible, only God (1 Tm 6:15; 1:17).

Chapter 4 . . . . . 112

The author investigates the theophanies in which God appeared to Adam and to Abraham.

Chapter 5 . . . . . 117

The various theophanies of Exodus are investigated.

Chapter 6 . . . . . 121

The special manifestation of God vouchsafed to Moses on Mount Sinai is discussed; it is treated allegorically, or at least typologically, because of the difficulty the author feels of giving any other interpretation to the concept of God having a face and a back.

Chapter 7 . . . . . 124

The author sums up the results of his investigation of the first of the three questions posed in chapter 3 of this book, noting also the bearing on the question of the vision in Daniel of the Ancient of Days and the Son of man.

*Book III*

Missions: The Work of Angels

Prologue . . . . . 127

Chapter 1 . . . . . 128

In which the author recapitulates; and then goes on to discuss the second of the three questions posed in chapter 3 of Book II, above; and in this chapter he sets the framework for his discussion of the activities of angels in the Old Testament theophanies by first considering the general order of God’s providential government of the universe, with special reference to first and secondary causes, and to the significant, or meaningfully symbolic character of God’s action in the world.



Chapter 2 . . . . . 134  
The problem of miracles wrought by demonic agencies is discussed, with particular reference to the magicians of Pharaoh; that this kind of thing in no way derogates from divine providence and the unique creative efficacy of God the first cause is shown by illustration from the case of Jacob's stock-breeding experiments with Laban's flocks.

Chapter 3 . . . . . 139  
The significance of the prodigies worked through the ministry of angels is examined more closely, and compared with the significance of the prophetic utterances and actions of people in the Old Testament.

Chapter 4 . . . . . 142  
That it was angels who were the secondary agents of the Old Testament theophanies is proved from scripture; chiefly from certain New Testament passages, but also from a brief reconsideration of certain episodes already discussed at length in Book II.

*Introductory Essay on Book IV* . . . . . 147

*Book IV*  
Missions: The Work of the Mediator

Prologue . . . . . 152

Chapter 1 . . . . . 153  
Man's need, and God's response to it; the harmonies of the incarnation and redemption, in which Christ mediates between God and man by observing, as it were, the basic harmonious proportion of 1 to 2; and how Christ in his death and resurrection is both the sacrament of our spiritual death and resurrection, and the model for our bodily death and resurrection.

Chapter 2 . . . . . 159  
The numerical harmony of 1 to 2, as manifested in the work of redemption, is further elaborated in terms of the number 6, treated mainly as symbolical of time; and the chapter closes with elevated reflections on the mystery of unity in multiplicity, harmony finally restored in the person and work of the one Word of God made flesh.

Chapter 3 . . . . . 166  
The work of the true mediator to life is contrasted with the work of the false mediator to death, the devil; it is shown how Christ conquered the devil in a just contest, and justly delivered man from the quasi-just rights which the devil possessed over him as a result of sin; finally, the false sacrifices which the devil still deludes his followers into trusting in are contrasted with the one true and perfect sacrifice of Christ, in which the knot of perfect unity is perfectly tied.

Chapter 4 . . . . . 172  
The pretension of platonic or plotinian philosophers to be able to purify themselves by their own intellectual and moral powers for the perfect contemplation of God is contrasted with the Christian dispensation, whereby man has to be purified for the contemplation of eternal things by submitting to faith in temporal things, namely, in the incarnation of the Word and the life, death, and resurrection of Christ; the philosophers' denial of the resurrection on philosophical grounds is also refuted, and the trustworthiness of the revelation contained in the scriptures on such matters is asserted.

Chapter 5 . . . . . 178  
The author comes back at last to the topic of the mission of the Son and the Holy Spirit; he affirms once more that their being sent does not imply that they are not equal to the Father, and defines their being sent into the world in time as the making known to the world that they proceed from the Father in eternity; he states in passing that the Holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Son as well as from the Father, and that even though the Father is mani-



fested to the world by sensible phenomena, we cannot say that the Father was ever sent, because he does not proceed from either of the other persons; and he concludes by discussing how the manifestations in time of the persons was brought about, without reaching any definite conclusions on the subject.

Foreword to Books V, VI, and VII . . . . . 186

Book V  
Linguistic and Logical: Substance and Relationship

Prologue . . . . . 189

Chapter 1 . . . . . 190  
On the basis of the principle, common to both parties, that nothing is predicated of God by way of modification of the divine being, that is by way of accident, he argues against the inference which the Arians drew from the names “unbegotten” for the Father and “begotten” for the Son that the Father and the Son must be of different substance from one another. He asserts that although nothing is predicated of God by way of modification, it does not follow that everything is predicated of him by way of substance; for some things are predicated by way of relationship, that is internal relationship within the godhead.

Chapter 2 . . . . . 196  
The use of substantive predications of God is examined in more detail, with a short foray included into the terminology of ousia and hypostasis, “substance” and “person,” which will be discussed much more thoroughly toward the end of Book VII.

Chapter 3 . . . . . 198  
The use of relative predications about God is examined in more detail; in particular the peculiarities of the names for the Holy Spirit of which “gift” is considered the most proper. Besides names by which the divine persons are referred to each other, names by which they are also referred to creation are discussed, like “origin” (principium), and even in some contexts “Father.”

Chapter 4 . . . . . 202  
A problem is discussed which is raised by those names that refer God to creation.

Book VI  
Linguistic and Logical: The Problem of Appropriation

Chapter 1 . . . . . 205  
The text Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God faces us with the possibility that perhaps all substantive predications, like goodness, greatness, and eternity, which do not seem to differ in quality from power or wisdom, should be treated really as quasi-relative predications, in such a manner that the Son is to be considered as the power, wisdom, goodness, greatness, and eternity by which the Father is powerful, wise, good, great, and eternal. The author plays sympathetically with this idea and shows that at least it does not involve any inequality between the divine persons.

Chapter 2 . . . . . 211  
The question of the divine simplicity, raised by the discussion of the last chapter, is further examined, and how it is to be reconciled with the divine trinity; a divine triplicity is excluded by it; but the individuality of the divine persons, how far for example one can talk about “the Father alone,” remains a problem; a quotation from Hilary is commented on at length in the hope that it might throw some light on this problem.



## Book VII

### Linguistic and Logical: The Problem Solved

#### Chapter 1 . . . . . 217

The question posed in the previous book is taken up and dealt with thoroughly; the tentative answer there assumed is set aside as having impossible logical consequences, and the definitive solution is proposed.

#### Chapter 2 . . . . . 223

Having established that "wisdom" is a substance and not a relationship word, the author goes on to inquire why in scripture it is almost always appropriated to the Son; he suggests it is because it is the Son who reveals the Father to us, and because our wisdom is to imitate the incarnate Son as the eternal Word imitates, by being the image of, the Father.

#### Chapter 3 . . . . . 227

The author investigates the logical status of the terms "person" and "substance" (Greek hypostasis); he concludes that they are simply terms of convenience which we have to use in order to be able to answer the question "Three what?" about the divine triad; we use them rather in spite of than because of their natural logical properties.

#### Chapter 4 . . . . . 234

The average sensual man just referred to is exhorted to cling to faith until he comes to some kind of understanding; in order to do this he is exhorted to activate in himself the image of the divine trinity, which is thus once more brought to our notice; and it is argued that this image does not mean likeness to the Son only, the equal and eternal image of the Father, but to all three persons. The book concludes with a quotation which sums up the whole approach of the first seven books, which began from the *initium fidei*—Unless you believe, you will not understand.

#### *Introductory Essay on Book VIII* . . . . . 237

## Book VIII

### Through the Looking-Glass

#### Prologue . . . . . 241

#### Chapter 1 . . . . . 242

God is nothing else but truth, and if we can see truth, we can see God; but our inner eyes are too weak to be able to gaze on truth itself.

#### Chapter 2 . . . . . 244

God is the good itself, the unchanging good, the good of all goods, in terms of which we love whatever good things we do love. So if we can see this good in which we love anything else that is good, and in which we live and move and are, we can see God.

#### Chapter 3 . . . . . 247

If we must love God in order to see him, as has been suggested in the last chapter, it might seem as if we are caught in a vicious circle. For we cannot love what we do not know, and therefore we must see God first, in the sense of know him, before we can love him. If the vicious circle is broken by faith, in that we can love something we believe but do not yet see or know, then faith too has a problem for us. For faith or belief in things we do not know presupposes a kind of general knowledge or experience about the things we believe, so that we can at least know what we believe; but about God, and especially about the trinity, we have no such general knowledge or experience, and so we are left with the question of how we can know what we believe about God.

#### Chapter 4 . . . . . 250

The problem raised in the last chapter is approached through the analogy of how we are able to love the just man, exemplified by Paul. The answer is found to be that we can only do this



because we see and love within ourselves, or rather in-and-above ourselves, the very form or idea of justice, and this even though we may not be just ourselves.

Chapter 5 . . . . . 253

Having examined the notions of truth and of the good, and offered a solution, in terms of the notion of the form of justice, to the problem of how we can love by believing what we do not know, the author goes on to examine the notion of love or charity itself; he sets out the mutual coherence or reciprocity of the twin commandments to love God and our neighbor; achieves an identification of charity with truth and the good and the form of justice; and finally sketches a trinity in love or charity, thus opening a way to our understanding of the divine trinity through these notions he has displayed in the course of this book; according to his closing words they provide the warp on which he will weave the fabric of the trinitarian image in man.

Foreword to Books IX - XIV . . . . . 258

Book IX  
Psychological: Mental Image, First Draft

Prologue . . . . . 270

Chapter 1 . . . . . 272

Starting from the trinity, triad or trio with which he concluded Book VIII, namely lover, what is loved, and love; and confining himself to mensor mind as its subject, Augustine expands this trinity into the apter one of mind, its knowledge and its love of self, mens, notitia sui, amor sui; and he establishes that these three are one substance, consubstantial, coequal, coinherent, and yet also distinct, unconfused, and mutually related.

Chapter 2 . . . . . 277

The author further investigates the knowledge which the mind has of things, and concludes that it essentially consists in a judgment of truth or of value about things, which can properly be called a mental word, or verbum mentis, which is a mental image of the thing known in the light of eternal truth. This word is provisionally defined as amata notitia, loved knowledge.

Chapter 3 . . . . . 283

The author looks for a reason why love should not be called word, or image, nor said to be begotten or conceived, like knowledge; this being a question that exercises him greatly with respect to the Holy Spirit. The reader must decide for himself what he makes of the suggested answer.

Book X  
Psychological: Mental Image, Second Draft

Chapter 1 . . . . . 286

he author takes up the idea he has just employed in showing why love cannot also be called offspring and image, namely that of "inquisitiveness" or the appetitus inveniendi, and giving it now the name of amor studentium, the sort of love studious people have, he asks the question how it can be reconciled with the axiom that you cannot love what you do not know; he establishes that this kind of love is not a love of the unknown, but a love of the known which stimulates inquiry, either a love of knowledge itself, or a love of some object of knowledge in general that prompts an investigation of it in detail, or a love of some universal truth or value, that prompts one to verify some particular application of it.

Chapter 2 . . . . . 291

The problem raised by the mind wanting to know itself is much more difficult, because as the author argues at length the mind cannot not know itself, being immediately present to itself. What then is the meaning of the famous Delphic injunction "Know thyself"? The validity of this injunction is taken as axiomatic, and it is interpreted as meaning that the mind



ought to think about itself; it can be said to have forgotten itself as a consequence of being distracted from itself by its concern for material things, whose images it has absorbed in memory and imagination, so that it confuses itself with such things. It is clearly suggested that this distraction and confusion is a result of the original fall from the right order of creation by sin, or turning away from God.

Chapter 3 . . . . . 294

A number of erroneous ways in which people have thought about the nature of mind, all in varying degrees materialistic, are reviewed; it is suggested that they are due to mind's tendency to confuse itself with its images of things perceived by the senses. The right way for mind to think about itself, it is then argued, is not for it to go looking for something else outside itself which it might consist of, but to distinguish itself from its images; the process should be one of the mind distinguishing what it supposes it might be, but is not sure about being (for example, fire, brain, harmony of elements, etc.) from what it knows it is; it knows that it is, that it lives, that it understands, that it wills, judges, remembers, and so on. It does not know, but only guesses that it is made of any material stuff. Therefore, so the author concludes, it is not made of any material stuff, but is a living, understanding, willing, being substance.

Chapter 4 . . . . . 300

Of the many mental acts of which mind is certain, the author selects memory, understanding, and will from which to construct his final draft of the image of the divine trinity in the mind.

*Book XI*  
Psychological: Mental Image, Lesser Analogies

Prologue . . . . . 303

Chapter 1 . . . . . 304

The author picks out a trinity in the act of seeing, or looking at an external object, its members being the appearance or look or visibility of the object in itself, the form or likeness of it impressed on the sense of sight, and the deliberate intention or act of will that fixes the sense of sight on the object. The distinction between these three elements, their relationships and the kind of unity they have, are discussed, and implicitly compared, not so much with the trinity of divine persons as with the trinity of the mental image.

Chapter 2 . . . . . 308

A more inward trinity in the psychic functioning of the "outer man" is picked out and discussed, namely that which declares itself when one thinks about some remembered object or event in an act of recollection; here the intention of the will joins together the attention of the mind, the "mind's eye" or *acies animi* as the author calls it, which corresponds to the sense of sight in the previous trinity considered, and the image stored in the memory, corresponding to the visible object in the sense trinity. Such acts of recollection or imagination are discussed in a distinctly moralizing context.

Chapter 3 . . . . . 312

The two trinities of the outer man so far outlined are further discussed, with particular reference to the proper distinctions between their members, and their mutual relationships; as regards the order or relationship between the first two members of each trinity, this is seen as being one of quasi-parent and quasi-offspring; and as regards the relationship of the third member to the first two, it is found that it cannot be conceived of either as quasi-parent or quasi-offspring. In conclusion it is made clear that there is a dynamic link, or a chain of movement between the acts involved in the outermost trinity of sense and those comprised in the more inward one of memory or imagination. We are already embarked on the movement of the psyche inward and upward.

Chapter 4 . . . . . 319

The discussion of the limits, or *modus*, set by memory on thought and the pull or thrust exercised by the will in operation, with which the last chapter ended, leads the author into a concluding reflection on the text of Wisdom 11:21, You have disposed all things in mea-



sure and number and weight; a preliminary glance at imaginative or fictitious thinking introduces this reflection.

*Book XII*

Man’s Case History: The Image Broken Up; The Fall

Chapter 1 . . . . . 322

The inner man, or mind, is distinguished into two departments or functions, a higher one concerned with contemplating eternal truth and making judgments in accordance with it, and in this function mind is most essentially itself; and a lower one concerned with the management of temporal and material affairs, which is derived from the higher function rather as the woman was derived from the man in the creation narrative of Genesis 2.

Chapter 2 . . . . . 324

Turning to the story of the first man and woman which he has introduced as an allegory of the two functions of the mind, he rejects another allegorical interpretation of it which sees the basic human family of man woman and offspring as the image of the divine trinity. Not only does this theory not fit the dogmatic requirements of trinitarian doctrine, it cannot either be reconciled with 1 Cor 11:7, where Paul asserts that the man alone is the image of God.

Chapter 3 . . . . . 329

The text from Paul quoted in the last chapter to demolish the opinion that the image of the trinity is to be found in the human trio of man, woman, and child presents an even greater problem itself, in that it seems to exclude woman altogether from being the image of God, in contradiction both to Christian good sense and to the text of Genesis 1:27. The problem is solved by explaining the apostle symbolically in support of the author’s symbolic exegesis of the Genesis story of the first couple to represent the functional structure of the human mind. This exegesis is pursued to show the fall narrative as realized in the disordered psyche of Everyman.

Chapter 4 . . . . . 337

The distinction already briefly proposed between wisdom and knowledge, sapientia and scientia, is examined in detail, the former being the appropriate quality of the higher function of mind and the latter of the lower. In the course of the discussion Plato’s theory of reminiscence is noticed and refuted. The quest for a trinity in knowledge is postponed to the next book.

*Book XIII*

Man’s Case History: The Image Repaired; Redemption

Chapter 1 . . . . . 342

Taking as his text for analysis the prologue of John’s gospel, the author proceeds to elaborate the distinction made in the previous book between wisdom as the proper activity of the higher reason and knowledge as the function of the lower reason. To this sphere of knowledge of temporal things he ascribes in particular faith, which he declares will be the main topic of this book.

Chapter 2 . . . . . 346

Taking up the idea of a common will, with which he was comparing a common faith at the end of the last chapter, he discusses at length the universal will to happiness. This seems at first to be a digression from the topic of faith, with which he professes to be concerned in this book; but in fact it is relevant to this topic, as he will go on to argue that faith is necessary if this desire for happiness, common to all men, is not to be frustrated.

Chapter 3 . . . . . 350

The author argues that real and total happiness implies and requires immortality; that it is therefore not available in this present life; hence that it is pursued by the philosophers in vain, and that faith alone guarantees the real possibility of a happy immortality through participation in the Word made flesh.



Chapter 4 . . . . . 355  
The temporal content of faith is examined, namely the incarnation of the Son of God and the life, death and resurrection of the Son incarnate; and the propriety or congruity of this divine economy of salvation is set forth as achieving our deliverance from the evil one by divine justice as well as divine power; whereby a principle is archetypically exemplified, of great consequence for social and political morality, that justice should precede power, and not vice versa.

Chapter 5 . . . . . 361  
The justice of God manifested in the redeeming death of Christ is further explored, as also the manifold quality of his grace presented to us in the mystery of the incarnation.

Chapter 6 . . . . . 366  
The author places what he has said about the redemption in the last two chapters into his scheme of "wisdom" and "knowledge"; recapitulates the course of the whole book; and concludes by sketching a mental trinity of faith, which belongs to the lower activity of the inner man, and is not yet the mental image of the divine trinity.

Book XIV  
Man's Case History: The Image Perfected

Chapter 1 . . . . . 370  
The author turns to the discussion of wisdom and its appropriate function of contemplation, in which the true image of God is to be found; but first he picks up a thread from the previous book and examines in more detail why in fact a trinity of faith as the appropriate function of knowledge may not be said to be the image of God.

Chapter 2 . . . . . 374  
The author now begins to look for a trinity in the inner man which will also be the image of God, and recalls what he said in the tenth book about the mind remembering, understanding, and willing itself; it is taken as axiomatic, though an axiom which raises problems, that the mind in some sense always remembers, understands, and loves itself; and yet this trinity is only actualized when the mind thinks about itself; so the place of thought or *cogitatio* in the production of the mental trinity is investigated more thoroughly and it is found that without thought there can be no mental word, and therefore no fully actual trinity which will be the actual image of God; thus we again are made to understand that the image of God is only fully realized in certain mental acts, not in mere mental potentialities.

Chapter 3 . . . . . 379  
Continuing with his examination of the trinity of the mind's remembering, understanding, and willing itself, and comparing it with the lesser trinities hitherto described, the author finds it to be truly the image of God, because unlike these other trinities it is "coeternal" with the mind itself and is not adventitious to the mind, that is to say, it does not come to it from outside; his presentation of the case involves him in an important explanation or defense of his use of the term "memory" in this context.

Chapter 4 . . . . . 384  
The final and perfect image of God is to be found not merely in the mind's remembering, understanding, and loving itself, but in its remembering, understanding, and loving God; it is shown that this trinity is no more adventitious to the mind than that of its self-awareness; and what can be meant by remembering God, understanding him and loving him is discussed.

Chapter 5 . . . . . 389  
The analysis of the image of God in the mind is concluded with some reflections on the re-fashioning or refurbishing of the image in a man, which is presented as a lifelong process that will in fact only be completed when God is seen at last face to face.



*Book XV*  
The Absolute Inadequacy of the Perfected Image

Prologue · · · · ·	395
Chapter 1 · · · · ·	396
The author recapitulates the conclusions he has so far reached, in a brief summary of the previous fourteen books.	
Chapter 2 · · · · ·	399
On the strength of Romans 1:20, <i>For his invisible things are descried by being understood through the things that have been made</i> , the author now tests the possibility of directly describing the divine trinity by inference from our understanding of creation; and he rules the possibility out, because all the divine perfections which we can infer in the creator from reflection on creation are identical with the divine substance—and thus of course substantively with each other—and therefore common to all three persons of the triad.	
Chapter 3 · · · · ·	407
Having shown that a direct intellectual understanding of the trinity in terms of the text of Romans 1:20 is not possible, the author turns to consider the possibility of an indirect vision of the mystery, in terms of 1 Corinthians 13:12: <i>We see now through a mirror in an enigma, but then it will be face to face</i> . The mirror is interpreted to mean the image of God, which is the human mind, and most of the chapter is devoted to discussing the enigmatic nature of this image, chiefly with respect to the mental word; the chapter closes with a suggested reason why it should have been the Word, not the Father or the Holy Spirit, that became man.	
Chapter 4 · · · · ·	414
The image seen enigmatically in the mirror is now examined to bring out its inadequacy, or unlikeness to the original; and first of all, in this chapter, with reference to the first eternal procession in God, that of the Son from the Father.	
Chapter 5 · · · · ·	421
The author goes on to point out the dissimilarity of the mental image with reference to the second eternal procession, that of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son; though in fact he seems rather to forget his precise intention, only reverting to it at the very end of this chapter; and with scarcely any reference to the image, or its third element of will or love, he discusses at length the propriety of the names we give to the Holy Spirit.	
Chapter 6 · · · · ·	431
The author concludes his examination of the dissimilarity of the image trinity to the divine Trinity with some general observations, not peculiar to either of the divine processions or any of the divine persons; then commends the image trinity, for all its inadequacy, as a means of access to communion with the divine; and finally reverts as a kind of afterthought to the problem of why the Holy Spirit is not said to be born, though he proceeds from the Father; and the only reason he can find for this is that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son as well as from the Father.	
Epilogue · · · · ·	441
The author first addresses his soul in a soliloquy, and then concludes the work with a prayer to God.	
Prayer · · · · ·	443
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