CONTENTS

I. Research Design of My Case Studies size (45% misses file What is Meaning out 1949 could gither \$2.5.1 in subset

	Acknowledgments page xiii paldaga da		
Caveats xv 88.1 2 220000 nt gradollant does 0			
Court Administration after the Split (193-20 noitsubortni Decades of Calibrating the Ministry of Paties			
	I. The Puzzle 9		
	II. The Approach 14		
	III. Overview of the Argument 16		
	IV. Plan of the Book 19		
RT	ONE Judicial Accountability: Theoretical Framework		
1	The Concept of Judicial Accountability 25		
	I. Unpacking the Notion of Accountability 30		
	II. Specifics of Judicial Accountability 36		
	III. The Concept of Judicial Accountability 40		
	IV. Why Judicial Accountability Matters? 59		
	V. De Jure versus De Facto Judicial Accountability 65		
	VI. Accountability Perversions 68		
2	Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability 73		
	I. What Do Judges Maximize? 74		
	II. What Is "In": Taxonomy of Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability 75		
	III. What Is "Out": Contingent Circumstances of Judicial Accountability 92		
	IV. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability in Recognition and Career Judiciaries 113		
3	Judicial Accountability and Judicial Councils 121		
	I. The Rise of Judicial Councils and Their Effects 121		
	II. The Judicial Council Euro-model of Court Administration 126		
	III. The Impact of the Judicial Council Euro-model on Judicial Accountability 136		

PA

PAI

RT	TWO	Holding Czech and Slovak Judges Accountable
4		ogue to the Case Studies: Methodology and Data orting 145
		Research Design of My Case Studies 145
	II.	What Is Measured 149
	III.	Data Collection 150
	IV.	Method and Evaluation 152
4	V.	Potential Inaccuracies 155
5	The	Czech Republic 158 sgaq zimsinghalwonoloA
	I.	The Czech Judiciary in Context 158
	II.	Court Administration after the Split (1993–2010): Two Decades of Calibrating the Ministry of Justice Model 181
	III.	Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability from 1993 to 2002 187
	IV.	Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability from 2003 to 2010 215
	V.	Overall Conclusion on the Czech Case Study 235
6	Slo	The Concept of Judicial Accountability 262 24 aikw
	I.	The Slovak Judiciary in Context 236
	II.	Court Administration after the Split (1993–2010): The Road from the Ministry of Justice Model to the Judicial Council Euro-model 254
	III.	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	IV.	Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability from 2003 to 2010 299
	V.	Overall Conclusion on the Slovak Case Study 333
7		aluation: The Czech Republic and Slovakia
		mpared 334
	I.	between 1993 and 2002 334
	II.	Comparing Results from Slovakia and the Czech Republic between 2003 and 2010 347
	III.	Effects of the Judicial Council Euro-model in Slovakia 361
	IV	Alternative Explanations 372

The Impact of the Judicial Council Euro-model on Judicial

PART THREE Conclusions and Implications

8

AGENOWLEDIGMENTS	
ils of Judicial Self-Government 389	
Court Presidents: Invisible Masters of Central and Easter	rn
The Judicial Leadership Theory of Judicial Councils	398
The Judicial Council Euro-model: Toward the System of Dependent Judges within an Independent Judiciary?	400
Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability in Transitional Societies 411	
Oversight of Judges: Why Fire Alarms Do Not Work?	42
Judicial Virtues Matter 428	
	European Judiciaries 390 The Judicial Leadership Theory of Judicial Councils The Judicial Council Euro-model: Toward the System of Dependent Judges within an Independent Judiciary? Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability in Transitional Societies 411 Oversight of Judges: Why Fire Alarms Do Not Work?

Annex A. Court System of the Czech Republic 433
Annex B. Court System of Slovakia 435
Annex C. The Number of Judges in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (1993–2010) 437
Bibliography 439
Index 465

- Support for training and career development of researcher