

# Contents

<i>List of figures</i>	page ix
<i>List of tables</i>	xiii
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xvii
1 Introduction	1
<i>Defining corruption</i>	4
<i>Political, socioeconomic, and cultural explanations for corruption</i>	9
<i>Institutional explanations for corruption</i>	11
<i>A theory of clarity of responsibility</i>	12
<i>Scope, data, and outline of the book</i>	14
2 A clarity of responsibility theory of corruption	17
<i>The concept of clarity of responsibility</i>	17
<i>The argument</i>	24
<i>Hypotheses</i>	28
<i>Conclusion</i>	32
3 A dataset of democracy and corruption	34
<i>Measuring democracy</i>	35
<i>Measuring parliamentarism and presidentialism</i>	37
<i>Measuring aggregate corruption</i>	42
<i>Conclusion</i>	46
4 Clarity of responsibility and aggregate corruption perceptions	47
<i>Variables and methods</i>	47
<i>Additional measures of clarity and accountability</i>	58
<i>Conclusion</i>	66

5	Corruption voting: a survey analysis	68
	<i>Clarity and corruption voting in the CSES data</i>	69
	<i>Clarity and corruption voting in the ISSP data</i>	82
	<i>Conclusion</i>	91
6	Corruption voting: an experimental analysis	92
	<i>Description of the survey experiment</i>	93
	<i>Results of the experimental test</i>	98
	<i>Extensions: probing the mechanisms</i>	102
	<i>Conclusion</i>	105
7	Elite anticorruption efforts	107
	<i>Clarity of responsibility and elite incentives to combat corruption</i>	108
	<i>Anticorruption programs in Eastern Europe</i>	109
	<i>Global patterns in anticorruption legislation</i>	116
	<i>Conclusion</i>	123
8	Elite attention to corruption	125
	<i>Clarity of responsibility and elite incentives to emphasize corruption in election campaigns</i>	125
	<i>Clarity and elite attitudes toward corruption</i>	137
	<i>Conclusion</i>	146
9	Conclusions	148
	<i>Scholarly implications</i>	150
	<i>Policy implications</i>	152
	<i>Future inquiry</i>	154
	<i>Appendices</i>	157
4.1	<i>Descriptive statistics, global sample</i>	157
4.2	<i>Robustness tests and additional models</i>	158
5.1	<i>Vote choice question wording</i>	163
5.2	<i>Descriptive statistics from CSES and ISSP surveys</i>	164
5.3	<i>Additional tables and figures from CSES and ISSP models</i>	165
6.1	<i>Descriptive statistics, survey experiment</i>	168
6.2	<i>Additional regression output, survey experiment</i>	169
7.1	<i>Datasets and descriptive statistics for elite efforts to combat corruption</i>	171
7.2	<i>Additional models</i>	173
8.1	<i>Descriptive statistics and additional models for Chapter 8</i>	173
	<i>References</i>	177
	<i>Index</i>	191