
CONTENTS

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	vii
<i>Introduction</i>	xiii
1. The Ideal State of Emergency	1
Introduction	1
The 'Ideal' Emergency	2
The Dictatorship of the Roman Republic	3
The Function and Powers of the Dictator	4
Controls on the Roman Dictatorship	7
Unleashing the Tyranny of Dictatorship	10
The 'Ideal' Emergency in Legal Systems Today	11
Defining the Phenomenon	12
International Human Rights Law	12
Constitutional Definitions	15
The Emergency Response	19
The Ideal Type Emergency Paradigm	21
The Existence of a Serious Threat to the State Recognised by an Organ of the State	22
A Reactive or Defensive Mechanism	23
The Consolidation of Powers in a Branch/Office of Government	24
The Enactment of Exceptional Measures that would not have been Permitted in a State of Normalcy	25
The Necessity of the Measures Enacted	26
The Separation of Normalcy and Emergency	27
Conclusion	30
2. The Permanent State of Emergency	33
Introduction	33
The Permanent State of Emergency: Separating Normalcy from Emergency	34
Individual Separation: Distinguishing Friend from Enemy	35
Geographical Separation	37
Legal Manifestations of Geographical Distinctions	43
Temporal Separation: The Permanent State of Emergency	45
The Fall of the Emergency Paradigm?	48

Is the Emergency Paradigm Obsolete? Focusing on the Decision-Maker.....	48
Framing the Emergency: Focusing on the Decision-Makers.....	50
Democratic Decision-Making and States of Emergency	52
The Broadening of Emergency Powers: Expanding the ‘Penumbra’	54
Terrorism as a Permanent Emergency	54
Economic Emergencies	57
De Facto Emergencies	61
Conclusion	62
3. Permanent States of Emergency and Constituent Power	65
Introduction	65
Power beyond Law? The State of Emergency and the Legal Order	66
The State of Emergency and the Pure Theory of Law.....	68
Power beyond the Law: Rejecting the Identity Thesis?.....	69
Carl Schmitt and the State of Exception.....	71
The Concept of the Political: The Friend–Enemy Distinction.....	71
Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism: The State of Exception.....	73
Carl Schmitt and the State of Exception.....	74
Confronting the State of Exception: Preserving the Identity Thesis.....	77
Conflicts between Norms: The Hierarchy of Norms	78
Conflicts between Constitutional Norms.....	80
Unconstitutional Constitutional Norms: The Case for Judicial Review	82
The Permanent State of Emergency as an Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment	85
Constitutional Desuetude.....	86
The Permanent State of Emergency and the Validity and Effectiveness of Constitutional Norms.....	88
Permanent States of Emergency and the Repudiation of Constitutional Norms	90
The Permanent State of Emergency as a Claim for the Constituent Power	91
Constituent Power and the State of Emergency: The Case of Ireland	95
Conclusion	98
4. Permanent States of Emergency and Legal Black Holes.....	99
Introduction	99
Legal Black Holes	100
National Security and Judicial Review.....	105
From Administrative Review to Constitutional Review	110
The Constitutional Validity of Legislation	111
Political Questions and Judicial Review	113

Sceptical Views of Judicial Review and the Rule of Law	116
Legal Black Holes and Zones Beyond Law.....	119
Zones Beyond Law v Legal Black Holes: The Irish Example	120
The Non-Justiciability of Article 28.3.3° and Constituent Power ...	123
Conclusions.....	125
5. Permanent States of Emergency and Legal Grey Holes.....	127
Introduction.....	127
Legal Grey Holes	127
Emergency Powers and Legal Grey Holes in Practice	130
Ireland	130
Article 15 ECHR and the Meaning of ‘Public Emergency Threatening the Life of the Nation’	132
The United Kingdom.....	134
Judicial Push Back?	136
Fortifying the Rule of Law? Human Rights and Legal Grey Holes.....	139
National Security and Human Rights.....	143
Legal Grey Holes and Constituent Power	147
The Two Limbs of the Schmittian Challenge	148
Beyond Human Rights Norms.....	152
Ireland: Beyond the Security–Liberty Divide.....	152
Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution: Beyond the Security–Liberty Divide	155
Beyond National Security Emergencies.....	157
Conclusions.....	158
6. Alternatives to Constitutional States of Emergency	161
Introduction.....	161
Why Emergency? The Problem with ‘Business as Usual’	161
‘Business as Usual’ and the ‘Shielding Effect’ of Emergency Powers	164
The Deepening of Emergency Powers: Legislative Accommodation	165
Legislative Accommodation: United States	166
Legislative Accommodation: United Kingdom	167
The ‘Deepening’ Effect of Legislative Accommodation	171
Permanent States of Emergency and Parliamentary Sovereignty.....	174
Prerogative Powers in a State of Emergency.....	175
Common Law Constitutionalism and Parliamentary Sovereignty	176
Common Law Constitutionalism and Emergency Powers.....	179
Parliamentary Sovereignty and Constituent Power	182
Relational Constituent Power	186
Parliamentary Sovereignty and Constituent Power: Conclusions	187

The Extra-Legal Measures Model.....	189
ELM and the Source of Legal Authority.....	191
ELM and the Authority of Affirmation	192
Extra-Legal Measures: Conclusions.....	193
Conclusions.....	194
7. Resisting the Permanent State of Emergency.....	197
Introduction.....	197
Reviewing the Existence of a State of Emergency	198
Ensuring Robust Review	198
Independent Reviewers in a Culture of Justification	202
Engineering Constitutions against Permanent	
States of Emergency.....	204
Legislative Scrutiny of Emergency Powers: Bruce Ackerman's	
Super-Majoritarian Escalator.....	204
Time-Limits and Sunset Clauses.....	205
'Discrete Conditions': The 'Shielding Effect' of Emergency Powers	206
Limited Emergency Powers.....	207
Proportionality as a Controlling Factor	208
The Transformative Nature of Permanent	
States of Emergency.....	209
Permanent States of Emergency and Constitutional Moments	211
Final Conclusions	213
 <i>Index</i>	 215