

# Table of Contents

<b>Acknowledgements</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>0. Prolegomenon</b>	<b>6</b>
0.1 Aim of the book	6
0.2 Against scientism	9
0.2.1 A dilemma for scientism	10
0.2.2 The descriptive limits of science	12
0.2.3 The explanatory limits of science	18
0.2.4 A bad argument for scientism	21
0.3 Against “conceptual analysis”	25
<b>1. Act and potency</b>	<b>31</b>
1.1 The general theory	31
1.1.1 Origins of the distinction	31
1.1.2 The relationship between act and potency	36
1.1.3 Divisions of act and potency	38
1.2 Causal powers	42
1.2.1 Powers in Scholastic philosophy	42

1.2.2 Powers in recent analytic philosophy	47
1.2.2.1 Historical background	47
1.2.2.2 Considerations from metaphysics	53
1.2.2.3 Considerations from philosophy of science	63
1.2.2.4 Powers and laws of nature	69
1.3 Real distinctions?	72
1.3.1 The Scholastic theory of distinctions	72
1.3.2 Aquinas versus Scotus and Suarez	77
1.3.3 Categorical versus dispositional properties in analytic metaphysics	79
<b>2. Causation</b>	<b>88</b>
2.1 Efficient versus final causality	88
2.2 The principle of finality	92
2.2.1 Aquinas's argument	92
2.2.2 Physical intentionality in recent analytic metaphysics	100
2.3 The principle of causality	105
2.3.1 Formulation of the principle	105
2.3.2 Objections to the principle	109
2.3.2.1 Hume's objection	109
2.3.2.2 Russell's objection	114
2.3.2.3 The objection from Newton's law of inertia	118

2.3.2.4 Objections from quantum mechanics	122
2.3.2.5 Scotus on self-motion	127
2.3.3 Arguments for the principle	129
2.3.3.1 Appeals to self-evidence	129
2.3.3.2 Empirical arguments	130
2.3.3.3 Arguments from PNC	134
2.3.3.4 Arguments from PSR	137
2.4 Causal series	146
2.4.1 Simultaneity	146
2.4.2 Per se versus per accidens	148
2.5 The principle of proportionate causality	154
<b>3. Substance</b>	<b>160</b>
3.1 Hylemorphism	160
3.1.1 Form and matter	160
3.1.2 Substantial form versus accidental form	164
3.1.3 Prime matter versus secondary matter	171
3.1.4 Aquinas versus Scotus and Suarez	175
3.1.5 Hylemorphism versus atomism	177
3.1.6 Anti-reductionism in contemporary analytic metaphysics	184
3.2 Substance versus accidents	189
3.2.1 The Scholastic theory	189

3.2.2 The empiricist critique	193
3.2.3 Physics and event ontologies	197
3.3 Identity	198
3.3.1 Individuation	198
3.3.2 Persistence	201
3.3.2.1 Against four-dimensionalism	201
3.3.2.2 Identity over time as primitive	208
<b>4. Essence and existence</b>	<b>211</b>
4.1 Essentialism	211
4.1.1 The reality of essence	211
4.1.2 Anti-essentialism	216
4.1.3 Moderate realism	223
4.1.4 Essence and properties	230
4.1.5 Modality	235
4.1.6 Essentialism in contemporary analytic metaphysics	237
4.2 The real distinction	241
4.2.1 Arguments for the real distinction	241
4.2.2 Objections to the real distinction	246
4.3 The analogy of being	256