
CONTENTS

<i>Table of Cases</i>	ix
<i>Table of Statutes</i>	xiii
<i>Tables and Figures</i>	xv
Introduction	1
Part A: Introduction to the Problem of Public Libel Law	
Overview of Part A.....	9
1. Balancing Freedom of Expression and Reputation in Constitutional Context	11
I. Defamation's Moving Target: Balancing Free Expression and Reputation	11
A. Constituent Elements	12
B. Defences	13
C. Publications to the 'World at Large'	15
D. Politicians and Public Libels—The Resonance of Radical Whig Ideology.....	17
E. Liberalising Media Defamation Defences	19
II. Overview of Public Libel Doctrine.....	20
A. United States	21
B. Australia	22
C. New Zealand	23
D. United Kingdom	24
E. Canada.....	27
III. Continuum of Doctrinal Solutions.....	28
IV. Public Libel Law's Theory-Doctrine Rift	29
A. Universal Rejection of the 'Actual Malice' Rule	29
B. Necessity for Expanded Comparative Law Framework.....	33
V. Chapter Conclusion	36
2. Methodological Barriers to Democratic Theorising.....	37
I. Overview.....	37
II. Methodological Barrier I.....	38
A. Freedom of Expression's Incomplete 'Core'	38

III.	Democratic Theorising in Public Libel Jurisprudence	41
A.	Meiklejohn's 'Self-Governance' Rationale	41
B.	Blasi's 'Checking Value' of the Press.....	46
IV.	Methodological Barrier II	52
A.	Necessity for 'Multi-Valued' Theorising.....	52
B.	Structural Institutionalism, Categoricalism, and Ad Hoc Balancing.....	56
V.	Moving Forward.....	59
Part B: Undertheorising Democratic Accountability: Comparative Law Analysis of Public Libel Doctrine		
Overview of Part B		61
3.	Indeterminate Balancing in Public Libel Doctrine: Generic Rules and 'Implied Rights'	63
I.	United States	63
A.	Defamation Plaintiffs, Generic Rules, and Democratic Theory	64
B.	Conclusion	76
II.	Australia	76
A.	Implied Rights: Disavowing Free Speech Theory	77
B.	Defamation and Implied Freedoms.....	81
C.	Methodological Crisis in the High Court.....	85
D.	Conclusion	89
III.	Chapter Conclusion	89
4.	Overlooking the Checking Function of the Press	91
I.	Overview	91
II.	Strasbourg Jurisprudence	91
A.	Press Freedom and Political Expression under the European Convention	91
B.	'Responsible Journalism' and Judicial Censure.....	93
C.	Conclusion	97
III.	United Kingdom	98
A.	Of 'Missing Rationales and Principles'	98
B.	Conclusion	106
IV.	New Zealand	106
A.	Bias against the Press in the Court of Appeal.....	106
B.	'Drawing the Line': Theoretical Disjunctions and Public Libel Reform	109
C.	Enlarging the Scope of Qualified Privilege.....	112
D.	Conclusion	116
V.	Chapter Conclusion	117

5. Conflating Meiklejohnian Theory and the Checking Function of the Press	119
I. Overview.....	119
II. United Kingdom.....	119
A. Reciprocity Obligations and Meiklejohnian Theory	120
B. Undertheorising in the UK Parliament	122
C. Conclusion	125
III. Canada	125
A. A ‘Quasi-Constitutional’ Press: The Checking Function before the Charter.....	126
B. Post-Charter Methodological Errors.....	128
C. ‘Rebalancing’ Defamation Law without the Checking Function	132
D. Conclusion	137
IV. Chapter Conclusion	138
Part C: Reasserting Democratic Accountability	
Overview of Part C.....	141
6. Distinguishing the Checking Function from Meiklejohnian Theory: Lessons from Public Accountability and Neo-Republicanism	145
I. Confronting a Conceptual Stalemate: ‘Representation’ and ‘Accountability’	145
II. Public Accountability Scholarship.....	150
A. Preliminary Observations	150
B. Accountability’s ‘Minimal Conceptual Consensus’	152
C. Accountability Mechanisms, Arrangements, and Regimes	153
D. Assessing Accountability	159
III. Neo-Republicanism: A Return to Institutional Design	161
A. Liberty as ‘Non-Domination’	161
B. ‘Gas-and-Water-Works’ Institutional Design.....	162
IV. Chapter Conclusion	166
7. A Revised Analytical Framework: Accountability Dysfunctions, Public Libel Doctrine, and the Institutional Press.....	167
I. Overview.....	167
II. Accountability Dysfunctions	168
A. A ‘Systems Approach’ to Accountability	168
B. Accountability Deficits	170
C. Accountability Overloads	171
III. The Institutional Press as a Horizontal Accountability Mechanism	173
A. Preliminary Observations	173
B. Watchdog or Guard Dog?.....	174

C. Empirical Evidence	177
D. Conclusion	184
IV. Public Libel Doctrine: Balancing Reputation and Freedom of Expression in Contemporary Democracies.....	185
A. Moving Toward a Revised Analytical Framework.....	185
B. Primary Mechanisms: Constitutional Structure	186
C. Secondary Mechanisms: Dynamic Variables.....	186
D. Calibration.....	186
E. Public Libel Doctrine: Legal Restrictions on the Press	188
V. Chapter Conclusion	191
Part D: Restoring Democratic Accountability	
Overview of Part D	193
8. Assessing Britain's Political Accountability Profile.....	195
I. Selecting a Law Reform Candidate.....	195
II. Britain's <i>Primary</i> Accountability Mechanisms.....	198
A. Parliamentary/Presidential Structure	199
B. Federal/Unitary Structure	202
C. Electoral System.....	204
D. Legislative Scrutiny.....	206
E. Judicial Review.....	211
F. Conclusion on Primary Accountability Mechanisms	213
III. Britain's <i>Secondary</i> Accountability Mechanisms.....	213
A. Governmental Auditors.....	213
B. Independent Regulators	216
C. Direct Public Access.....	218
D. Conclusion on Secondary Accountability Mechanisms	220
IV. Chapter Conclusion	220
9. Reinstating the Checking Function in Britain's Constitutional Context	221
I. Law Reform Recommendations	221
A. Rationale for Britain's Public Libel Doctrine	221
B. Specific Law Reform Proposals	223
II. Discussion.....	228
A. Methodological Constraints and Further Research.....	228
B. Comparative Law Reflections	230
C. Institutional Competence	236
III. Chapter Conclusion	237
Conclusion—Prospective Challenges to Public Libel Law Reform.....	239
Index	243