

# Contents

<i>List of Tables</i>	xv
<i>Table of Cases</i>	xvii
<i>List of Contributors</i>	xxvii
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xxix
<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<i>Helen Keller and Daniel Moeckli</i>	
<b>I. THE PAST: WHAT HAVE THE COVENANTS (NOT) ACHIEVED?</b>	
<b>2. The History of the Covenants: Looking Back Half a Century and Beyond</b>	<b>7</b>
<i>Maya Hertig Randall</i>	
I. Introduction	7
II. The Political Context	10
III. Select Thorny Issues	14
A. The rights to be included	14
B. States' obligations under the Covenants	17
C. Measures of international supervision and enforcement	23
IV. Concluding Remarks	26
Bibliography	27
<b>3. Giving Meaning and Effect to Human Rights: The Contributions of Human Rights Committee Members</b>	<b>31</b>
<i>Gerald L Neuman</i>	
I. Introduction	31
II. The Functions of the Human Rights Committee	31
III. The Committee and Its Members	37
IV. The Interpretative Function of the Members	40
Bibliography	46
<b>4. Interpretation of the ICESCR: Between Morality and State Consent</b>	<b>48</b>
<i>Daniel Moeckli</i>	
I. Introduction	48
II. The CESCRC as Interpreter	49
III. Rules of Interpretation	51
A. The ICESCR	52
B. VCLT articles 31–33	52
IV. A Special Regime of Treaty Interpretation?	53
A. 'Special' interpretive methods	54

1. Effectiveness	54
2. Evolutive interpretation	55
B. Legality of 'special' interpretive methods	56
V. Between Morality and State Consent	58
A. Morality	59
1. Object and purpose: Teleological interpretation	59
2. Rules of international law	60
3. 'Special' interpretive methods	61
B. State consent	62
1. <i>Travaux</i> as supplementary means of interpretation	62
2. Wording: Textual interpretation	63
3. Subsequent practice	63
C. Morality or State consent?	64
VI. Generating Legitimacy	65
A. Adherence	67
B. Coherence	67
C. Transparency	68
VII. Conclusion	71
Bibliography	72
5. <b>NGOs: Essential Actors for Embedding the Covenants in the National Context</b>	75
<i>Patrick Mutzenberg</i>	
I. Introduction	75
II. Cooperation with the Committees Primarily Related to the Reporting Procedure	77
A. The role of NGOs in the reporting procedure	77
1. NGO interaction prior to the review	80
2. NGO interaction during the State report review	81
B. The role of NGOs in the elaboration of General Comments	84
C. The role of NGOs in the individual communications procedure under the Optional Protocols	86
III. The Emerging Role of NGOs in the Implementation of Concluding Observations and Views	87
A. At the national level	87
1. Raising awareness at the national level	87
2. Engaging with national stakeholders	88
B. Participation in the committees' follow-up procedure	89
1. The embryonic follow-up procedure of the CESCR	89
2. The key role of NGOs in the follow-up procedure of the HRC	90
C. Difficulties for NGOs in engaging systematically with the UN treaty body system	92
IV. Conclusion	93
Bibliography	94

## II. THE PRESENT: WHAT IS THE INFLUENCE OF THE COVENANTS?

<b>6. Influence of the ICESCR in Africa</b>	99
<i>Manisuli Ssenyonjo</i>	
I. Introduction	99
II. Influence of the ICESCR on the African Regional Human Rights System	101
III. Influence of the ICESCR on the Domestic Protection of Human Rights in Africa	107
A. Are the rights protected in the ICESCR part of domestic constitutions in Africa?	107
B. Dualist approaches to the ICESCR in Africa and their influence on human rights	109
C. Monist approaches to the ICESCR in Africa and their influence on human rights	117
IV. Conclusion	121
Bibliography	122
<b>7. Influence of the ICCPR in the Middle East</b>	124
<i>Başak Çali</i>	
I. Introduction	124
II. Challenges to Surveying the Influence of the ICCPR in the Middle East	126
III. Pathways for Influence: Ratification, Reservations, Engagement, and Legal Status	130
A. Reservations to the ICCPR	133
B. Engagement with the Human Rights Committee	135
C. Domestic legal status of the ICCPR	137
IV. Resistance to HRC's Concluding Observations in the Middle East Region	140
A. States of emergency, counter-terrorism, and extraordinary judicial practices	140
B. Death penalty	142
C. Extraordinary administration of justice systems	143
D. Non-discrimination and equal citizenship agenda	144
E. Minorities and indigenous peoples	145
F. Democratic expression of political pluralism	147
V. Conclusion	147
Bibliography	149
<b>8. Influence of the ICESCR in Latin America</b>	151
<i>Mónica Pinto and Martín Sigal</i>	
I. Introduction	151
II. The Region's Constitutional Frameworks and Their Approach to International Human Rights Instruments	153

	154
A. Argentina	155
B. Brazil	155
C. Chile	156
D. Paraguay	156
E. Uruguay	156
F. Venezuela	156
G. Ecuador	157
H. Bolivia	157
I. Interim conclusion	157
III. Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights	157
A. The road to justiciability	161
B. A new form of litigation	
IV. Influence of the ICESCR on the Jurisprudence of National Courts	162
A. Argentina	163
B. Brazil	165
C. Colombia	166
D. Venezuela	168
E. Other countries' experiences	170
V. Influence of the ICESCR on the Regional Human Rights System	171
A. The San Salvador Protocol	171
B. Measuring progress	172
C. Incorporating ESCR into the regional case law	173
VI. Political Impact, Poverty, and Social Rights Violations: The CDESCR and the IACHR	175
VII. The By-products of ESCR's Justiciability in the Region	179
VIII. Concluding Remarks	180
Bibliography	181
9. Influence of the ICCPR in Asia	184
<i>Yogesh Tyagi</i>	
I. Introduction	184
II. Preliminary Observations	185
III. Theoretical Framework	186
IV. Assessment of the Influence of the ICCPR	187
A. Participation in the drafting of the ICCPR	187
B. Acceptance of the ICCPR	188
C. Reservations and declarations	189
1. Objections to reservations and declarations	190
2. Withdrawal of reservations and declarations	191
D. Status of treaties under domestic law	191
E. Influence of the ICCPR on domestic law	195
F. Influence of the ICCPR on domestic courts	196
1. Influence of the draft ICCPR	196
2. Influence of the ICCPR before States' ratification or accession	196
3. Influence of the ICCPR on the domestic courts of the States parties	197
G. Influence of the ICCPR on legal scholarship	198

H. Influence of national human rights institutions	201
I. Reporting record	203
J. Influence of General Comments and concluding observations	205
K. Influence of Views	206
L. Influence of the Universal Periodic Review	207
M. Availability of human rights documents in local languages and their accessibility	208
N. General support	209
V. Concluding Remarks	209
Bibliography	212
<b>10. Influence of the ICESCR in Europe</b>	<b>215</b>
<i>Amrei Müller</i>	
I. Introduction	215
II. Influence of the ICESCR by Acceptance of ESCRs' Direct Effect?	218
A. Signs of increased legal influence	218
B. Signs revealing the limits of legal influence	225
III. Particularities of Domestic Systems	231
IV. The Financial and Economic Crises as a Chance for Reinforced Engagement with the ICESCR in Europe?	235
V. Concluding Remarks	239
Bibliography	240
<b>11. The Influence of the Two Covenants on States Parties Across Regions: Lessons for the Role of Comparative Law and of Regions in International Human Rights Law</b>	<b>243</b>
<i>Samantha Besson</i>	
I. Introduction	243
II. A Framework for the Proposed Regional Human Rights Comparison	246
III. Comparative Analysis of the Regional Influence of the Two Covenants	251
A. Comparative analysis	252
1. International law status	252
2. 'Domestic international law' status	255
3. Domestic constitutional order	257
4. Domestic institutions	258
5. Other domestic actors	260
B. An overall assessment: Four trends and five needs	261
IV. A Comparative Law Argument for the Authority of the Committees' Interpretations	262
V. Three Proposals for Enhancing the Legitimacy of the Committees' Interpretations	264
A. The role of subsidiarity in Covenant law	265
B. The role of comparison and transnational consensus in Covenant law	267
C. The role of regions and regional human rights regimes under Covenant law	269

VI. Conclusions	273
Bibliography	273
III. THE FUTURE: WHAT SHOULD BECOME OF THE COVENANTS?	
12. The Covenants in the Light of Anthropogenic Climate Change	279
<i>Stephen Humphreys</i>	
I. Introduction	279
II. Preambles to the Covenants	283
III. Common Article 1 (Self-determination)	286
IV. Jurisdiction (Articles 2)	291
A. Article 2 of the ICCPR	291
B. Article 2 of the ICESCR	294
V. Limitation/Derogation (Articles 4 and 5)	296
A. Common article 4 of the ICCPR and ICESCR	296
B. Common article 5 of the ICCPR and ICESCR	298
VI. Conclusion	298
Bibliography	301
13. The Covenants and Financial Crises	303
<i>Christine Kaufmann</i>	
I. Introduction	303
II. Anatomy of Financial Crises: Who, How, and What?	304
A. Typologies of an 'equal opportunity menace': Currency, balance of payments, and debt and banking crises	304
B. Human rights impacts of financial crises	307
1. Economic, social, and cultural rights	308
2. Civil and political rights	309
3. Equality and non-discrimination	310
C. Human rights in times of financial crises: Two case studies	311
1. Argentina	311
2. Greece	314
III. States' Human Rights Obligations in Times of Financial Crises	317
A. States' obligations as parties to the UN Covenants	318
B. State responsibilities as members of IFIs or participants in rescue programmes	320
C. Obligations of States with regard to private actors	322
IV. Human Rights Obligations and Responsibilities of IFIs and Their Members	323
A. Obligations and responsibilities	323
B. IFIs' human rights obligations—Much ado about nothing?	323
C. Human rights-related responsibilities of IFIs?	326
D. The role of the UN human rights bodies	327

V. Conclusion: People, Process, and Paradigm	328
A. People-oriented, rights-based perspective	328
B. Processes for ensuring coherence	329
C. Paradigm reloaded: Emancipation and translational human rights	329
Bibliography	330
<b>14. The Institutional Future of the Covenants: A World Court for Human Rights?</b>	<b>334</b>
<i>Felice D Gaer</i>	
I. Introduction	334
II. Human Rights Treaty Implementation and the Covenants	337
III. Past Treaty Reform Efforts	338
IV. Recommendations for Reform by Alston, and Others	339
V. Consolidation Ideas: Stakeholder Meetings and Beyond	340
VI. Arbour's Proposal Deferred: A Unified Standing Treaty Body	343
VII. The Dublin Statement and Treaty Body Strengthening	344
VIII. The General Assembly Concludes the Treaty Strengthening Process	345
IX. A 'World Court' for Human Rights?	346
X. Improving Individual Communications: What Should be Done?	350
Bibliography	355
 <i>Index</i>	 357