

Contents

<i>List of Tables</i>	page xi
<i>List of Figures</i>	xiii
<i>Preface and Acknowledgments</i>	xvii
I MODALITIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS	
1 Between Clients and Citizens: Puzzles and Concepts in the Study of Distributive Politics	3
1.1 <i>Conceptualizing Modes of Distribution</i>	6
1.2 <i>Basic Questions About Distributive Politics</i>	18
1.3 <i>Why Study Clientelism?</i>	22
1.4 <i>Structure of the Book</i>	24
1.5 <i>A Comment on Research Methods</i>	26
II THE MICRO-LOGIC OF CLIENTELISM	
2 Gaps Between Theory and Fact	31
2.1 <i>Theories of Distributive Politics</i>	32
2.2 <i>Explaining the Anomaly: Is "Loyalty" Endogenous?</i>	54
2.3 <i>Explaining the Anomaly: Turnout-Buying?</i>	66
2.4 <i>Explaining the Anomaly: Subcontracting?</i>	72
3 A Theory of Broker-Mediated Distribution	75
3.1 <i>A Model of Rent-Seeking Brokers</i>	77
3.2 <i>The Objectives of Party Leaders</i>	91
3.3 <i>The Implications of Agency Loss</i>	92
4 Testing the Theory of Broker-Mediated Distribution	96
4.1 <i>Who Are the Brokers?</i>	98

4.2	<i>Testing Assumptions and Hypotheses of the Broker-Mediated Theory</i>	100
4.3	<i>Conclusion</i>	129
5	<i>A Disjunction Between the Strategies of Leaders and Brokers?</i>	130
5.1	<i>Theories of Distribution by Party Leaders</i>	131
5.2	<i>Do Swing Districts Receive Party Largess?</i>	136
5.3	<i>Leaders and Brokers in Four Developing Democracies</i>	144
5.4	<i>Conclusion</i>	151
6	<i>Clientelism and Poverty</i>	152
6.1	<i>Introduction: Poverty of Nations and of Voters</i>	152
6.2	<i>National Poverty and Nonprogrammatic Distribution</i>	154
6.3	<i>Individual Poverty and Nonprogrammatic Distribution</i>	158
6.4	<i>Why Do Machines Target the Poor?</i>	161
III THE MACRO-LOGIC OF VOTE BUYING: WHAT EXPLAINS THE RISE AND DECLINE OF POLITICAL MACHINES?		
7	<i>Party Leaders Against the Machine</i>	175
7.1	<i>Broker-Mediated Theory and the Returns to Clientelism</i>	179
7.2	<i>Clientelism and Programmatic Politics: A Model</i>	187
7.3	<i>When Do Leaders Choose Machine Politics?</i>	191
7.4	<i>Testing the Theory</i>	196
8	<i>What Killed Vote Buying in Britain and the United States?</i>	200
8.1	<i>Introduction</i>	200
8.2	<i>Britain</i>	208
8.3	<i>The United States</i>	227
8.4	<i>Conclusion</i>	242
IV CLIENTELISM AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY		
9	<i>What's Wrong with Buying Votes?</i>	245
9.1	<i>Distributive Politics and Democratic Theory</i>	245
9.2	<i>Nonprogrammatic Distribution and the Diversity of Harms</i>	249
9.3	<i>Arguments in Favor of Nonprogrammatic Distribution</i>	254
9.4	<i>Conclusions</i>	258
	<i>Appendix A: Argentina Brokers' Survey</i>	261
	<i>Appendix B: Argentina Voters' Surveys</i>	279
	<i>Appendix C: Venezuela Voters' Survey and the Maisanta Database</i>	281
	<i>Appendix D: India Voters' Survey</i>	297
	<i>References</i>	299
	<i>Index</i>	311