

Contents

<i>Preface to First Edition</i>	xi
<i>Preface to Second Edition</i>	xiii
<i>Preface to Third Edition</i>	xiv
<i>Preface to Fourth Edition</i>	xv
Introduction	I
Overview	I
The Nature of Metaphysics—Some Historical Reflections	2
Metaphysics as Category Theory	10
Notes	15
Further Reading	15
I The Problem of Universals I: Metaphysical Realism	17
Overview	17
Realism and Nominalism	17
The Ontology of Metaphysical Realism	19
Realism and Predication	21
Realism and Abstract Reference	26
Restrictions on Realism—Exemplification	29
Further Restrictions—Defined and Undefined Predicates	35
Are There Any Unexemplified Attributes?	39
Notes	42
Further Reading	44
2 The Problem of Universals II: Nominalism	45
Overview	45
The Motivation for Nominalism	45
Austere Nominalism	50
Metalinguistic Nominalism	60
Trope Theory	70
Fictionalism	77
Notes	79
Further Reading	81

3 Concrete Particulars I: Substrata, Bundles, and Substances	82
Overview	82
Substratum and Bundle Theories	83
An Objection to the Bundle Theory—Subject-Predicate Discourse	90
Another Objection to the Bundle Theory—the Identity of Indiscernibles	94
An Argument for the Substratum Theory	99
Problems for the Substratum Theory	101
Aristotelian Substances	104
Notes	114
Further Reading	116
4 Propositions and Their Neighbors	118
Overview	118
The Traditional Theory of Propositions	118
Nominalism about Propositions	127
Facts, States of Affairs, and Events	139
Notes	146
Further Reading	148
5 The Necessary and the Possible	149
Overview	149
Problems about Modality	150
Possible Worlds	154
Possible Worlds Nominalism	157
The Metaphysics of Possible Worlds Nominalism—David Lewis	162
Actualism and Possible Worlds—Alvin Plantinga	168
Notes	179
Further Reading	180
6 Causation	181
Overview	181
Hume's Account of Causation	181
The Response to Hume	186
Neo-Humean Approaches	189
Notes	196
Further Reading	197
7 The Nature of Time	198
Overview	198
McTaggart's Argument	198
The B-Theory	205

The A-Theory	209
The New B-Theory	216
Notes	221
Further Reading	222
8 Concrete Particulars II: Persistence through Time	223
Overview	223
Two Theories of Persistence—Endurantism and Perdurantism	223
Persistence and the Nature of Time	227
The Ontology of Perdurantism	231
An Argument for Perdurantism—Change in Properties	235
A Second Argument for Perdurantism—Change in Parts	239
Notes	248
Further Reading	249
9 Concrete Particulars III: Parts and Wholes	250
Overview	250
The Problem of the Many	251
Mereological Nihilism	253
Mereological Moderatism	255
Mereological Universalism	263
Constitution Metaphysics	264
Partism	267
Relative Identity	269
Simple Universalism	271
Notes	275
Further Reading	278
10 Metaphysical Indeterminacy	279
Overview	279
What Is Metaphysical Indeterminacy?	280
Epistemic Indeterminacy	283
Examples of Metaphysical Indeterminacy?	287
Composition and Metaphysical Indeterminacy	287
Future Contingents and Metaphysical Indeterminacy	290
Quantum Physics and Metaphysical Indeterminacy	292
Linguistic and Metaphysical Indeterminacy	292
Moral Indeterminacy and Metaphysical Indeterminacy	294
Evans's Argument Against Vague Identity	295
Notes	301
Further Reading	303
11 The Challenge of Anti-Realism	304
Overview	304
Two Views about the Nature of Reality	304

Dummett's Anti-Realist	310
The Inscrutability of Reference	317
Putnam's Anti-Realism	323
Realism or Anti-Realism?	328
Notes	337
Further Reading	338
<i>Bibliography</i>	339
<i>Index</i>	350
Two Views about the Nature of Reality	391
Overview	391
The Challenge of Anti-Realism	391
Further Reading	391
Notes	391
Evans's Argument Against Vague Identity	391
Moral Indeterminacy and Metaphysical Indeterminacy	391
Linguistic and Metaphysical Indeterminacy	391
Quantum Physics and Metaphysical Indeterminacy	391
Future Contingents and Metaphysical Indeterminacy	391
Composition and Metaphysical Indeterminacy	391
Examples of Metaphysical Indeterminacy	391
Epistemic Indeterminacy	391
What is Metaphysical Indeterminacy?	391
Overview	391
Metaphysical Indeterminacy	391
David Lewis	391
Further Reading	391
Notes	391
Metaphysical Indeterminacy	391
Simple Universalism	391
Relative Identity	391
Parism	391
Constitution Metaphysics	391
Metaphysical Universalism	391
Metaphysical Modalism	391
The Problem of the Many	391
Overview	391
Concrete Particulars III: Parts and Wholes	391
Further Reading	391
Notes	391
A Second Argument for Perdurantism—Change in Parts	391
An Argument for Perdurantism—Change in Properties	391
The Ontology of Perdurantism	391
Persistence and the Nature of Existence	391
Two Theories of Persistence—Endurantism and Perdurantism	391
Overview	391
Concrete Particulars II: Persistence through Time	391
Further Reading	391
Notes	391
Dummett's Anti-Realist	391
The Inscrutability of Reference	391
Putnam's Anti-Realism	391
Realism or Anti-Realism?	391
Notes	391
Further Reading	391
<i>Bibliography</i>	391
<i>Index</i>	391