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It is symptomatic of these discontinuities that the very term 'epistemology' goes back only to the middle of the nineteenth century, before which time philosophers evidently felt no need for a special label to talk about the study of knowledge. Moreover, the ways in which philosophy has been divided over previous centuries have left no space for epistemology as a distinct field of inquiry. For Aristotelians as well as for Stoics, philosophy looks down into logic, physics, and ethics. (Aristotle's metaphysics was seen as founding a kind of appendix to the physical sciences.) Among Arabic philosophers, following the traditions of late antiquity, theoretical philosophy standardly divided into physics, mathematics, and metaphysics, logic being a further subject on the side. In the seventeenth century things were much the same. Thomas Hobbes divided the sciences that study natural bodies from those that study political bodies, including among the former physics, ethics, poetry, and logic, but not the study of knowledge itself. John Locke distinguished "three great provinces of the intellectual world": the nature of things, moral philosophy, and the doctrine of signs.<sup>1</sup> He and his contemporaries conceived of his great *Essay* as falling into that last category—a treatise of logic, to name of these divisions is there any hint of epistemology—under any name—as a special subject, let alone as a foundational philosophical subject.<sup>2</sup>