

## Contents—Detailed

<i>Table of Cases</i>	xv
<i>Table of Instruments</i>	xxi
<i>Table of Other Materials</i>	xxv
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xxxi

### I. INTRODUCTION

<b>1. Introduction</b>	3
1. Introduction	3
2. Definition of Accountability	5
3. Scope of the Book	8
4. Background to Legal Debate	8
5. Damage to the Accountability Framework	15
6. Theories Relied upon by Accountability Mechanisms	18
7. Design of the Book	21
<b>2. Added Value of Application of International Human Rights Law to Armed Groups</b>	27
1. Introduction	27
2. Relationship between IHRL and IHL	28
3. Assessment of the Added Value of IHRL in Non-International Armed Conflicts	35
4. Relationship between Territory and Added Value	65
5. Conclusions	67

### II. LEGAL PERSONALITY OF ARMED GROUPS UNDER HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

<b>3. Evaluative Framework: Legal Personality under International Law</b>	71
1. Introduction	71
2. Rationale behind Evaluative Framework on Legal Personality	73
3. Introduction to Evaluative Framework on Legal Personality	75
4. States-Only Conception of International Legal Personality	76
5. Recognition Conception of International Legal Personality	77
6. Background to Individualistic, Formal, and Actor Conceptions of International Legal Personality	78
7. Individualistic Conception of International Legal Personality	80
8. Formal Conception of International Legal Personality	82
9. Actor Conception of International Legal Personality	84
10. Commonalities and Differences between the Conceptions of International Legal Personality	87

<b>4. The Law on Belligerency and Insurgency, and International Legal Personality</b>	90
1. Introduction	90
2. Law on Belligerency	91
3. Legal Personality of Belligerent Armed Groups	97
4. Insurgency and the Legal Personality of Armed Groups	104
5. General Intercourse between Armed Groups and States as a Source of Legal Obligations	107
6. General Functionality on International Sphere as a Source of Legal Personality	111
7. Conclusions	113
<b>5. International Humanitarian Law and International Legal Personality</b>	118
1. Introduction	118
2. Threshold of IHL: Procedural Perspective	118
3. Threshold of IHL: Material Perspective	125
4. Threshold of IHL: Theoretical Perspective	142
5. Conclusions	149
<b>6. International Legal Personality of Armed Groups under Human Rights Law</b>	152
1. Introduction	152
2. International Legal Personality Exists Along a Spectrum	152
3. Legal Personality Can Be General or Specific	153
4. Legal Personality of Different Armed Groups	154
5. Legal Frameworks Can Accommodate High Degree of Heterogeneity Within Category 'Armed Groups'	154
6. International Legal Personality of Armed Groups May Have Different Sources	155
7. Link between Legal Personality of Armed Groups and Control of Territory is Not New	155
8. Legal Threshold for Application of Human Rights Law to Armed Groups	157
9. Role of Armed Groups in Creation of Customary International Law	170
10. Conclusions	173
 <b>III. HOW AND WHEN ARE ARMED GROUPS BOUND BY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW?</b>	
<b>7. How are Armed Groups Bound by International Humanitarian Law?</b>	177
1. Introduction	177
2. Existing Theories on How Armed Groups are Bound by IHL	178
3. Armed Groups Bound as Third Parties to the Geneva Conventions	179

4. Armed Groups Bound as a Result of the Domestic Implementation of Treaty Law	185
5. Armed Groups Bound Directly through Constituent Members or as an Entity	187
6. Armed Groups Bound as a Result of Controlling Territory	199
7. Armed Groups Bound through Customary International Law	203
8. Conclusions	206
<b>8. Armed Groups and Treaty Law</b>	209
1. Introduction	209
2. The ICCPR and ICESCR	210
3. The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)	217
4. The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict	226
5. The African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (the Kampala Convention)	232
6. Conclusions	238
<b>9. Control of Territory and Human Rights Obligations of Armed Groups</b>	240
1. Introduction	240
2. Principle of Effectiveness	242
3. Law on State Responsibility Regarding Armed Groups	246
4. Case Law from the General Claims Commission of 1923 between the United States and Mexico	254
5. Case Law from the American Civil War	258
6. ICJ Namibia Principle and European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence	260
7. Cases from the Franco-Italian Conciliation Commission	264
8. Comparison of Emerging Conclusions with Political Science Analysis of Armed Conflict	267
9. Conclusions on Circumstances in which Acts of an Armed Group Can Be Considered an Act of State	268
10. Conclusions for International Humanitarian Law	271
11. Conclusions for International Human Rights Law	272
12. Implications for How Armed Groups are Bound by Human Rights Law	273
13. A Bottom-Up Approach: Rights Devolving with Territory and Population	274
14. Allocation of Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts Committed by Armed Groups	276
15. Conclusions	281

<b>10. Armed Groups and Crimes against Humanity</b>	285
1. Introduction	285
2. Armed Groups and Crimes against Humanity	286
3. What Kinds of Armed Groups Can Commit Crimes against Humanity?	303
4. Normative Significance of a Finding that Armed Groups Can Commit Crimes against Humanity	307
5. Conclusions	321
<b>11. Armed Groups and Customary International Human Rights Law</b>	323
1. Introduction	323
2. Can Armed Groups Contribute to the Formation of Custom?	324
3. Evaluation of Practice Holding Armed Groups Bound by Customary International Human Rights Law	334
4. Conclusions	355
<b>IV. CONCLUSIONS</b>	
<b>12. Conclusions</b>	359
1. Accountability in Peril	359
2. Overriding Purpose of the Book	361
3. Conclusions on 'Added Value' of International Human Rights Law	361
4. Conclusions on Legal Personality of Armed Groups under Human Rights Law	366
5. Operational Perspective	387
6. Value of Parallel Accountability Processes	391
7. Concluding Remarks	392
<i>Select Bibliography</i>	395
<i>Index</i>	421