

Contents

<i>List of Figures</i>	<i>page</i> xi
<i>List of Tables</i>	xiii
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xvii
1 Introduction	1
1.1 Why Are Regional Human Rights Courts Important for Rights Protection?	8
1.2 Comparing Regional Courts in Europe and the Americas	13
1.3 Organization of the Book	20
2 Explaining Regional Human Rights Court Deterrence	24
2.1 Introduction	24
2.2 Explaining Regional Human Rights Court Deterrence	28
2.2.1 Two Types of Deterrence	28
2.2.2 The Deterrence Process	29
2.2.3 Regional Human Rights Court Deterrence: General and Specific	31
2.2.4 Regional Human Rights Court Deterrence: Prosecutorial and Social	35
2.3 Regional Court Deterrence: The Role of the Executive	38
2.3.1 Executive Implementation of Court Orders	38
2.3.2 The Executive and Human Rights Policy	40
2.3.3 The Executive's Trade-Off	43
2.4 Executive Decision Making	47
2.4.1 Executive Capacity and Human Rights Policy	48
2.4.2 Executive Willingness and Human Rights Policy	54
2.4.3 High Capacity, High Willingness, and Human Rights Policy	69
2.5 Conclusion	71

3	Examining Patterns of General Regional Court Deterrence	76
3.1	Practices and Procedures of Regional Courts	79
3.1.1	The European Court of Human Rights	79
3.1.2	The Inter-American Court of Human Rights	81
3.1.3	Comparing Practices and Procedures across Regional Courts	82
3.2	Regional Human Rights Court Effectiveness	85
3.2.1	Effectiveness versus Compliance	87
3.3	Examining General Deterrence	91
3.4	Evidence of General Regional Court Deterrence	97
3.4.1	General Deterrence through Regional Court Presence	97
3.4.2	General Deterrence through Regional Court Activity	102
3.5	Conclusion	107
4	Does the Executive have the Capacity to Respond to Adverse Judgments?	110
4.1	The Role of Policy Change Feasibility	114
4.1.1	Data and Methodology	115
4.1.2	Evidence of Executive Capacity: Policy Change Feasibility	122
4.2	The Role of Fiscal Flexibility	126
4.2.1	Empirical Models	127
4.2.2	Evidence of Executive Capacity: Fiscal Flexibility	128
4.3	Conclusion	132
5	Is the Executive Willing to Respond to Adverse Judgments? The Role of Mass Public Pressure	133
5.1	Data and Methodology	137
5.2	Regional Court Deterrence Is Conditional on Mass Public Support	138
5.2.1	The Role of Executive Job Security	138
5.2.2	Evidence of Executive Willingness: Executive Job Security	140
5.2.3	The Role of Threats to the Political and Social Order	152
5.2.4	Evidence of Executive Willingness: Threats to the Political and Social Order	155
5.2.5	Examining the Conflicting Effects of Mass Public Support	160
5.3	Conclusion	164

6	Is the Executive Willing to Respond to Adverse Judgments? The Role of Elite Pressure	166
6.1	Data and Methodology	172
6.2	Regional Court Deterrence Is Conditional on Economic Elite Support	173
6.2.1	The Role of Economic Elite Support	173
6.2.2	Evidence of Executive Willingness: Economic Elites	175
6.3	Regional Court Deterrence Is Conditional on Political Elite Support	181
6.3.1	The Role of National Judicial Support	181
6.3.2	Evidence of Executive Willingness: National Judiciaries	184
6.3.3	The Role of National Legislative Support	191
6.3.4	Evidence of Executive Willingness: National Legislatures	193
6.4	Conclusion	203
7	Amplified Regional Court Deterrence: High Executive Capacity and High Executive Willingness	207
7.1	Evidence of High Executive Capacity and Willingness	215
7.1.1	Regional Court Deterrence: The Effect of Executive Capacity in the Presence of High/Low Willingness (Hypothesis 8a)	218
7.1.2	Regional Court Deterrence: The Effect of Executive Willingness in the Presence of High/Low Capacity (Hypothesis 8b)	221
7.1.3	Robustness Tests: Examining Change in Respect for Rights	224
7.2	Conclusion	226
8	Conclusion	228
8.1	Main Argument and Findings: Summary	229
8.2	Comparing Regional Courts in Europe and the Americas	232
8.3	Policy Implications: An Effective International Human Rights Regime	240
8.3.1	Designing an Effective International Human Rights Regime	240
8.3.2	Designing Effective Regional Human Rights Arrangements	244
8.4	A Path Forward: Future Research	246

8.4.1	General Deterrence and Regional Human Rights Courts	247
8.4.2	Strategic Regional Court Judges	249
8.4.3	Complementary or Competing: International and Regional Human Rights Bodies	251
8.4.4	Backlash in the International Human Rights Regime	252
8.5	Concluding Comments	253
Appendix A	Chapter 3 Appendix	254
A.1	Control Variables	254
A.2	Full Model Results	257
Appendix B	Chapter 4 Appendix	260
B.1	Control Variables	260
B.2	Full Model Results	264
Appendix C	Chapter 5 Appendix	273
C.1	Control Variables	273
C.2	Full Model Results	274
Appendix D	Chapter 6 Appendix	292
D.1	Control Variables	292
D.2	Full Model Results	293
Appendix E	Chapter 7 Appendix	306
E.1	Control Variables	306
E.2	Full Model Results	307
	<i>References</i>	311
	<i>Index</i>	323