TABLE OF CONTENTS

Tab	le of	European Court of Justice Cases	xli
		General Court Cases	lxix
	-	Legislation	lxxiii
		Treaties and International Instruments	lxxxviii
		Treaty on the European Union (TEU) Provisions	xcviii
		Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) Provisions	ci
		Equivalences	cviii
		PART I: HISTORY AND NATURE	
1.		Historical Perspective I: From Community to Union (1957–1993) ver Goebel	3
	I.	The Launching of the EEC: 1952–1972	4
		A. Visions and Reality: The EEC Treaty	4
		B. The EEC Governing Institutions Begin OperationsC. The Court of Justice: Composition, Operational Role,	7
		and Constitutional Doctrines	12
		(1) Structure and Operational Role	12
		(2) The Court's Constitutional Doctrines	14
		D. The European Council Authorizes the First Enlargement	17
	II.	1973–1984: Post-enlargement Progress Followed by Euro-stagnation	19
		A. The European Council Provides New Political Leadership	19
		B. Constitutional Developments: The Direct Election of Parliament	21
		C. The Court's Constitutional Doctrines	23
		D. Progress Towards Achieving the Common MarketE. New Fields of Action: Social Policy, Environmental Protection, and Consumer Protection	24
	TTT		20
	ш.	1985–1993—New Horizons: The Internal Market Programme and	21
		the Single European Act A. The June 1985 Intermed Monkey Programmes	31
		A. The June 1985 Internal Market Programme B. The Single European Act Rejuvenates the EEC	31
		C. New Ambitions: Monetary Union and the Maastricht Treaty	37
		(1) The Road to Monetary Union	37
		(2) The Road to Maastricht	38
		D. The Social Charter and the 1989 Social Action Programme	41
		E. Continuity in Court of Justice Doctrines	42
	IV.	Conclusion	45
2.		Historical Perspective II: The New Architecture (1994–2009) The Goebel	46
	I.	Introduction	46
	1,	A. The Community Governmental Institutions Take on a Modern Look	49
		B. Enlargement: The Union's Success Proves a Magnet	52
		C. The Road to Monetary Union and the Euro	55
		D. Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaty Innovations	57
		(1) The Subsidiarity Principle	57

			(2) Citizenship of the Union: Rights of Free Movement and Residence(3) New Fields: Social Policy, Employment Policy, Consumer Protection,	58
			Education, and Public Health	59
			(4) The 2000 Anti-discrimination Directives	61
		_	(5) The Charter of Fundamental Rights	63
		E.	Noteworthy European Community Developments, 1994–2009	65
			(1) Internal Market Programmes and Legislation	65
			(2) External Commercial Relations and Trade Policies	67
			(3) Competition Policy	68
		F.	The Pillars: Intergovernmental Fields of Action	69
			(1) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)	69
			(2) Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (CJHA)	70
	II.	Cc	onclusion	73
3.	An	Int	ernational Perspective	74
			na Eckes and Ramses A. Wessel	
	I.		troduction	74
	1.			
	II.		ne European Union as a Global Actor	76
			'State-Like' Actions of the EU in International Relations?	76
			Classifying the EU under Public International Law	80
		C.	The Division of Competences between the EU and its Member	
			States: Special Treatment?	83
	III.	Re	econsidering the Union's External Posture in the Light of Sovereignty	86
			Sovereignty and Statehood	87
			Sovereignty under Public International Law: A Popular Element?	90
			EU Law's 'Original' Nature Built on Assumed Sovereign Rights	93
			The National Perspective	96
	TV/		assification and Conclusion	99
	IV.	CI	assincation and Conclusion))
,		,	E. St. & Pauls of Actions So did Jobsos Englishmental Protection, and	102
4.			stitutional Perspective	103
	Koe	n L	enaerts and José A. Gutiérrez-Fons	
	I.	In	troduction	103
	II.	Ar	Autonomous, Self-sufficient, and Coherent System of Norms	105
	111.		ne Constitutional Features of EU Law	108
		A.	Individual Liberty, the General Interest, and Constitutional Pluralism	108
			(1) Limitations on Individual Liberty	109
			(2) Individual Liberty, EU Harmonization, and Value Diversity	110
			(a) In the Presence of EU harmonization	110
		-	(b) In the Absence of EU harmonization	111
		В.	Federalism and the EU	112
			(1) The Principle of Conferral	112
			(2) Subsidiarity and Proportionality	115
			(a) The Principle of subsidiarity	115
			(b) The Principle of proportionality (2) The Principle of Singary Congruence	116
			(3) The Principle of Sincere Cooperation (4) The Principle of National (Comprise of Marine all Handing)	118
			(4) The Principle of National (Constitutional) Identity	120
			(5) Within and beyond the Bounds of the Principle of Conferral	121
		0	(6) Mutual Trust and Mutual Recognition	122
		C.	The Principle of Institutional Balance	124

	 The Principle of Institutional Balance and the European Parliament The Principle of Institutional Balance as Applied to the ECJ New Challenges to the EU Institutional Framework EU Agencies 	125 126 127 127
IV.	 (b) A new form of governance? The EU Principle of Democracy A. The Democratic Transformation of the EU B. Understanding Democracy in a Supranational Context C. The EU Principle of Democracy as Applied by the ECJ 	129 132 132 136 137
V.	Concluding Remarks: A Constitutional Order of States and Their Peoples	139
	Comparative Perspective nest A. Young	142
I. 646 646 646 646 646 646 646	Two Europes A. Federal Europe (1) Competences (2) Sovereignty (3) Subsidiarity (4) Constitutionalism and the Democratic Deficit B. Intergovernmental Europe (1) Governmental Capacity (2) Administrative Capacity and Implementation (3) Identity	146 148 148 150 153 155 157 158 162
162 II. 162 161 161	The Future of European Integration: Of Federalism and Time A. 'Ever Closer Union'? B. Shocks to the System: The Euro and Other Crises (1) Fiscal Federalism and Member State Sovereignty (2) Variable Geometry and Intergovernmentalism	171 172 177 179 185
III.	Conclusion The state of the st	188
6. The	PART II: CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS e Competences of the Union	191
	eodore Konstadinides	101
I. II.	Introduction Express Provisions Defining EU Competences A. Getting to Grips with the Lisbon Typology B. Exclusive Competence C. Shared Competence (1) Recourse to Article 114 TFEU D. Supporting Competence E. Separate Categories of Competence	191 192 194 195 198 201 204 206
876. III. 882 182	A. The Flexibility Clause of Article 352 TFEU B. External Implied Competence under Article 216(1) TFEU	208 209 212
IV.	The Balance of EU Competences	214

	V.	Concluding Remarks: The Future	218
7.		Principle of Subsidiarity erico Fabbrini	221
	I.	Introduction	221
	II.	Nature and Meaning	223
		Philosophical Foundations	228
	IV.	Judiciai Sareguards	232
	V.	Political Safeguards	236
	VI.	Conclusion	242
8.	The	Principle of Proportionality	243
	Tak	is Tridimas	
	I.	Definition and Scope	243
	II.	What Does Proportionality Entail?	246
		A. Suitability	247
	III.	The Less Restrictive Alternative Test	248
		A. The Standard of Scrutiny	250
		B. The Manifestly Inappropriate Test	251
		C. Strict Scrutiny	253
	IV.	Proportionality and the Internal Market	254
	V.	Proportionality and Limitations on Charter Rights	256
		A. The Right to Personal Data and the Right to Family Life B. Proportionality in the AFSJ	257 259
		C. The Enduring Appeal of Proportionality	261
	VЛ	Conclusions	263
	٧1.	Conclusions	203
9.		ect Effects and Indirect Effects of Union Law	265
	I.	Introduction	265
		The state of the Links of the L	266
	II.	Direct Effect(s): General Principles A. Direct Applicability and Direct Effect	266
		B. Direct Effect: From Strict to Lenient Test	268
		C. Addressees: Judicial and Executive Authorities	271
		D. Dimensions: Vertical and Horizontal	272
	III.	Direct European Law: Special Principles	273
		A. Primary Law: EU Treaties and Charter	273
		B. EU Secondary Law: Regulations and Decisions	274
	IV.	Indirect European Law: Directives	277
		A. Direct Effect: Conditions and Limits B. The No-horizontal-direct-effect Rule	277 279
		C. Vertical Effects: The Wide Definition of State (Actions)	280
		D. (Incidental) Horizontal Direct Effect: An Exception to the Rule	281
	V.	External European Law: International Agreements A. Direct Effect: Legal and Political Conditions	283 284

		B. Dimensions: Vertical and HorizontalC. Beyond Treaties: Customary International Law	286 287
	VТ	Indirect Effects: General Principles	290
	٧1.	A. Indirect Effects of European on National Law	290
		B. Indirect Effects of Primary on Secondary Union Law	292
		C. Indirect Effects of Secondary on Primary Union Law?	293
		D. Indirect Effects of External on Internal Union Law	296
	VЛТ	.Conclusion	
	V 11	. Conclusion	298
10.	The	Twin Doctrines of Primacy and Pre-emption	300
	Am	edeo Arena	
	I.	Introduction	300
	TT		
	11.	The Doctrine of EU Primacy A The Origina Doctrine and Nature of EU Primacy	301
		A. The Origins, Development, and Nature of EU Primacy (1) EU Primacy's Jurisprudential Genesis: From <i>Humblet</i> to <i>Costa</i>	302 302
		(2) From <i>Costa</i> Onwards: The Manifold Primacy Mandate	302
		of National Organs	305
		(3) The Nature of EU Primacy: 'Constitutionalisation' of a Treaty or	30)
		'Creative Development' of International Treaty Law?	307
		B. The Scope and Limits of EU Primacy	312
		(1) The Broader Context: International Treaties and	312
		Domestic Constitutions	313
		(2) The Internal Limits to EU Primacy: A Non-absolute Principle	315
		(3) The External Limits to EU Primacy: National Judicial	0.25
		Defiance as a Catalyst for Decentralized Change?	318
	TTT	Asia in a several succession (Section of the Section of the Sectio	322
	111.	The Doctrine of EU Pre-emption A. The Origins and Conceptualizations of EU Pre-emption	323
		B. A Comprehensive Conceptual Framework for EU Pre-emption	326
		C. Legislative Pre-emption: Conflicts Involving EU Secondary Law	328
		(1) Scope-overlap Test	328
		(2) Conflict Pre-emption	329
		(3) Field Pre-emption	331
		D. Constitutional Pre-emption: Conflicts Involving EU Primary Law	335
		(1) Scope-overlap Test	335
		(2) Conflict Pre-emption	337
		(3) Field Pre-emption	338
		E. ERTA Pre-emption: The Subsequent Exclusivity of EU External	
		Competences	341
		(1) Scope-overlap Test	342
		(2) Conflict Pre-emption	344
		(3) Field Pre-emption	345
	IV.	Conclusions	348
C ar	_	eeralu IVII v	
11.		cere Cooperation and Respect for National Identities	350
	Bar	bara Guastaferro	
	I.	Introduction: Article 4 of the Treaty on European Union	350
	II.	The Principle of Presumed Member State Competence	353
	III	The Principle of Sincere Cooperation	35/

		A. The 'Positive' Obligation upon Member States to Take Any Appropriate	355					
		Measure to Ensure Fulfilment of the Obligations Arising Out of EU Law B. The 'Negative' Obligation upon Member States to Refrain from Any	3))					
			357					
		C. Loyalty in Comparative Perspective	359					
		(1) Sincere Cooperation in EU Law and Good Faith in International Law	359					
		(2) Sincere Cooperation in EU Law and Federal Fidelity in						
			362					
	IV.	The Principle of Respect for Member States' National Identities	366					
		A. History of the Identity Clause	366					
		B. The Use of Article 4(2) TEU in the Case Law of the Court of Justice of						
		the European Union	367					
		(1) Review of National Measures	367					
		(2) Review of EU Measures	372					
	V.	The Unitary and Pluralist Twists of the European Integration Process	374					
	٠.	A. The Unitary Twist of the Principle of Sincere Cooperation	374					
		B. The Pluralist Twist of the Duty to Respect Member States' National Identity	376					
	3.77							
	V1.	Towards a Less 'Integrationist-biased' Concept of Sincere Cooperation?	270					
		The New Balance Provided by the Treaty of Lisbon	379					
	-	Light shoot foreigners as an arbitrary of	202					
12.		The European Union and Fundamental Rights 383						
	Sion	naidh Douglas-Scott						
	I.	Introduction	383					
	II.	Fundamental Rights in the EU: The Growth of an Idea	384					
		The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights	387					
	111.	A. The Earlier History of the Charter	389					
		B. The Content of the Charter	390					
		C. The Legal Effect and Scope of the Charter: Problematic Issues	390					
		(1) The Applicability of the Charter	391					
		(2) Protocol 30: An 'Opt-out' for the UK and Poland	393					
		(3) Horizontal Effect	395					
		100 also fine prepared to be designed as a contract from a temperature of the major species of the first specie	396					
		(4) The Distinction between Rights and Principles	397					
		(5) The Charter and National Constitutional Law(6) The Charter and the ECHR						
		pulppegetti ki 41 cg	397					
	IV.	EU Accession to the ECHR	399					
		A. The Court's Reasoning in Opinion 2/13	400					
		(1) The Specific Characteristics and the Autonomy of EU Law	401					
		(2) Article 344 TFEU	401					
		(3) The Co-respondent Mechanism	402					
		(4) The Procedure for the Prior Involvement of the Court of Justice	402					
		(5) The Specific Characteristics of EU Law as Regards Judicial Review						
		in CFSP Matters	403					
		B. Reflections on the Opinion	403					
		C. The <i>Bosphorus</i> 'Presumption of Equivalence'	405					
		D. The Future of the EU in the ECHR	406					
	V.	Fundamental Rights as 'General Principles of Law'	407					
		A. 'The Sins of Youth'	408					
		B. Defensive Use of Human Rights	409					

	C. Binding the Member States and D. The Continuing General Principles of Jurisprudence	411 412
VI.	Further Development of a Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence A. Conflicts of Rights	413 413
	B. Fundamental Rights at the Pinnacle of the EU Legal Order?	414
	C. The Ongoing Dialogue with National Courts and Authorities	415
	D. The Silence of EU Fundamental Rights Law?	416
	E. A More Developed Fundamental Rights Law for the EU?	418
VII	. Human Rights in the Broader Context	419
VII	II. Conclusion	421
12 1-	and the FILT cost of the state	422
	ve Peers	423
I.	Introduction	423
II.	Ordinary Treaty Revision Procedure	425
	A. Scope of the Procedure B. Procedural Rules	426 428
254		
111.	Simplified Revision Procedures	431
	A. Amendments to Part Three of the TFEU	431
	(1) Overview (2) A right (9(6) in Propries	431
	(2) Article 48(6) in Practice (3) Procedural Rules	432 433
	(4) Substantive Limits on Article 48(6)	433
	B. Changes to Decision-making Rules	438
TV	Accession and Withdrawal	442
ıv.	A Accession Tracer Procedure	442
	D W: 1 1 1 D 1	446
V	Conclusions	450
Anı	niex 1	450
	List of Special Legislative Procedures (1) Covered by Article 48(7) TEU	450
	(2) Not covered by Article 48(7) TEU	450 451
Anı	nex II	-/-
	List of Unanimous Voting Requirements (1) Covered by Article 48(7) TEU	452 452
	(1) Covered by Article 48(7) TEU (2) Not covered by Article 48(7) TEU	150
	PART III: INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK	
14. The	European Parliament	457
Kie	ran Bradley	
I.	Introduction: Parliament as an 'Institution' and Representative of	
	the Citizens some modes? I had been anothern't legal removed ared	457
II.	Composition of Parliament and Elections	459
	A. Number and Allocation of Seats	459
	B. Adoption of the Election Procedure	459
	C. Electoral Procedure (1976 Act)	461

	III.	Parliament Elections E. Verification of Credentials F. Incompatibilities G. Vacancy of Seat The Role and Status of Members of the European Parliament A. Representative Functions and Independence B. Rights of Individual Members C. Legal Proceedings by Individual Members of the European Parliament	463 464 465 466 466 466 466 468
		 D. Statute of Members of the European Parliament E. Privileges and Immunities of Members of the European Parliament (1) Absolute Immunity (Article 8 PPI) 	470 470 471
		(2) Qualified Immunity (Article 9 PPI)	473
		(3) Justiciability of Immunity Decisions(4) Disclosure of Certain Personal Data of Members of	473
		the European Parliament	474
	IV.	Organization of Parliament's Work	474
		A. Organizational Autonomy and the Treaty	474
		B. Parliament's Rules of Procedure C. Officers of Parliament	475 476
		D. Standing Parliamentary Committees and Interparliamentary Delegations	477
		E. Political Groups	478
		F. Political Parties at the European Level	480
		G. The Seat and Working Places of the European Parliament	481
	V	uitBle shiros no sumid svispandod. Lei	482
	V.	Supervisory Functions and Powers A. Council and European Council	482
		B. Commission	483
		C. The European Ombudsman	483
		D. Appointment Powers in Respect of other Institutions and Officers	484
		E. Petitions	484
		(1) Scope and Admissibility of Petitions	485
		(2) Procedure for Handling Petitions	486
		F. Inquiry Committees	486
	ΣД		
	VI.	Parliament and the Court of Justice	487
	VII.	National Parliaments	488
		Lie of Lina innou. Voting Poquirements	
15.		European Council fgang Wessels	490
	I.	Introduction: Looking at a Key Institution	490
		A. Political and Academic Relevance	490
		B. Models: Contrasting Concepts and Assessments	492
		(1) The Presidency Model: The European Council as Supreme Authority	492
		(2) The Council Model: Towards Communitarization	493
		(3) The i Model: The Dominant Multi-level Player	494
	II.	Basic Features: Legal Provisions and Real Performance	495
		A. Legal Provisions: Ambiguous Formulations	495
		B. Real World Observations: Search for Comprehensive Leadership	496
		(1) Economic Governance: Towards an Economic Government	496
		(2) External Action: A Voice for a Common Foreign and Security Policy	498

		and Pre-legislative Leadership	499
	III.	Inside the European Council: The Puzzle of Consensus Formation A. Working Style: Confidential Deliberations B. The Role of the President (1) History and Legal Provisions (2) The Election of the President: Constraints for an Ambitious Leader C. Phases, Procedures, and Patterns of Deliberations and Decision-making (1) Preparation (2) Getting to Consensus: Concluding Agreements (3) The Power Factor: Leaders and Followers	501 501 502 503 504 504 505 506
	IV.	Shifting the Institutional Balance: Towards Horizontal Fusion A. The European Parliament: Towards an Uneasy Bicameral System B. The Council: Serving the Masters? C. The Commission: Only Agent for the Principal? D. The Court: The Legal Watchdog E. The European Central Bank: New Forms of Participation F. National Parliaments: Emerging Players in the Institutional Architecture G. Revisiting the Models	508 509 510 511 512 512 513
	V.	Conclusion: Trends towards Fusion A. Revisiting the Performance B. Long-term Perspectives: Rise or Decline of the European Council? (1) The European Council as a Guardian of the Nation State (2) The European Council as a Federator (3) The European Council as Fusion Engine	514 514 515 515 516 517
16.	The	Council	518
		lipp Dann	
	I.	Context and Conceptual Framework: Executive Federalism	519
	II.	Organizational Structure: Form Follows Function A. Composition: Appointed Executives, Not Elected Politicians B. Configurations: The Pyramid of Working Groups, Committees, and Ministers	521521522
		C. Coherence: General Affairs Council, Rotating Presidency,	
		and General Secretariat (1) General Affairs Council	525 525
		(2) Rotating Council Presidency	526
		(3) The General Secretariat of the Council	527
	III.	Competences and Partners: The Council as Team Player A. Overview and General Characteristics	528 528
		B. General EU Stewardship and Implementation—with the Commission	529
		C. Legislature and Budgetary Power—with the European Parliament	530
		 Governments as Legislature? Relation between Council and European Parliament The Council and the Legislative Procedures 	531531532
		(4) Budgetary Role of the CouncilD. Agenda-setting and Foreign Policy—with the European CouncilE. The Council as Coordinator	534536538
	IV.	Decision-making: Consensus in the Shadow of the Vote	540

		A. Challenges to the Consensus Culture	541 543
		B. Reasons for the Longevity and Necessity of Consensus	
	V.	Legitimacy: Fifty Shades of Grey	544
		A. Conceptualizing the Legitimacy of the Council	544
		B. Interrogating the Legitimacy of the Council	545
		(1) General Concerns	545
		(2) Democratic Concerns about the Council as Legislature	546
		(3) Democratic Concerns about the Council as Coordinator	547
	VI.	Conclusion	547
17.	The	Commission	549
		r Oliver and Bernd Martenczuk	
	I.	Introduction	549
	II.	Composition and Term of Office	550
		A. The Size of the Commission	550
		B. Qualifications Required of Members of the Commission	551
		C. The Appointment Procedure	552
		(1) The President	552
		(2) The High Representative	554
		(3) The Other Members of the Commission	554
		(4) The Final Steps	555
		(5) Replacement of Individual Members of the Commission	555
		D. Term of Office and Removal of Commissioners	555
	III.	Duties of Members of the Commission	559
		A. During their Term of Office	559
		B. After their Term of Office	561
		C. Sanctions	562
	IV.	Internal Organization	563
	V.	Functions, Duties, and Powers	568
		A. General	568
		B. Guardian of the Treaties	568
		C. Legislative Proposals	570
		D. The Adoption of Non-legislative Acts	574
		E. Amending the Treaties	575
		F. The Budget	575
		G. Coordination, Executive, and Management Functions	576
		H. Internal and External Representation of the Union	576
		I. Annual and Multi-annual Programming	578
		J. Ancillary Communications	578
	VI.	'Dealing with Current Business'	579
	VII.	Concluding Remarks	580
10	The	Court of Justice of the European Union	581
10.		is Tridimas	701
	I.	Introduction	581
	II.	Article 19 TEU: The Rule of Law, the Separation of Powers, and	
	11.	the Bifurcated Nature of the EU Judicial System	582

e e III.	Composition, Appointment, and Tenure A. Composition	584 584
	B. Method of Appointment and TenureC. The Role of the Advocate General	586 588
IV.	Jurisdiction	592
	A. Categories of Jurisdiction	592
	B. Exclusivity	594
	C. From Exclusivity to Autonomy	596
V.	Organization and Procedure	598
810	A. Organization	598
	R Procedure	599
	C. The Collegiality of the Judgment	601
VI	The Judicial Architecture and the Reform of 2015	602
٧1.	A 771 T 1: 1 A 1:	602
	P. The Consul Court	602
	C. Judicial Caseload	605
	D. The Reform of the GC	607
19 The	European Central Bank	610
	iara Zilioli and Phoebus Athanassiou	010
I.	Introduction	610
II.	Institutional Framework of the European System of Central Banks,	
	the Eurosystem, and the ECB	611
	A. ESCB and Eurosystem	611
	B. Objectives and Tasks of the Eurosystem	612
	C. The ECB and but to not be a set to not be a set.	613
	(1) The ECB's Legal Status and Its Implications	613
	(2) The ECB's Place within the EU	
	(a) The ECB's place in the international arena and another (b)	615
	(3) ECB Independence	616
	(4) ECB Transparency and Accountability	619
	(5) ECB Decision-making Bodies	619
	(a) Governing Council	620
	(b) Executive Board	620
	(c) General Council	621 621
	(6) ECB Regulatory Powers (a) ECB legal acts	622
1.00	(b) ECB legal instruments	623
		023
III.	Eurosystem Governance, Structure, and the Relationship between ECB and NCBs	625
	A. Introductory Remarks	625
	B. Structure and Governance of the Eurosystem and how supposed the (1)	625
	C. Decentralization of Operations	626
	D. The Principle of Specialization	627
	E. Guidelines and Instructions: The NCBs' Duty of Compliance	627
	F. Status of the NCBs When Performing Eurosystem Tasks	628
80°IV	The ECB's Involvement in the Legislative Process	630
699	A. The ECB's Right of Initiative	630
		000

	В.		ECB's Advisory Role		631
			The ECB's Advisory Role with Regard to EU		631
		(2)	The ECB's Advisory Role with Regard to Draf	t National	(21
			Legislative Provisions		631
V.			olving Role of the ECB Since the Start of the	ne Financial Crisis	633
	A.		3 Crisis-related Response	faind been gonal 7	633
		(1)	Temporary Broadening of the Eurosystem Co.	llateral Eligibility Rules	
			and Enhanced NCBs Collateral Policy Discret		635
			Provision of Liquidity in Leading Foreign Cur	rencies	637
			The Covered Bonds Purchase Programmes	ta Oggerlagion	638
			Securities Markets Programme and Outright I	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	638
			ABS Purchase Programme and Public Sector I	Purchase Programme	642
	D		Concluding Remarks		643
			B and Macro-prudential Supervision		644
			3 and Micro-prudential Supervision		645
			ECB's Role in Supporting the ESM		649
500 VI.	Co	nclu	ding Remarks		650
20. The	Co	nirt (of Auditors		651
		nnec			0,1
_					(50
ulò I.			action: The Role of the Court of Auditors		652
			Role of the Court		652
			right against riadd		654 655
			Seat of the institution		
II.	Hi	story	on the European of the will and he		655
Ele III.	Th	e Co	mposition of the Court of Auditors		657
			mber of Members		657
	В.	App	ointment of Members		658
		(1)	Qualifications		658
		(2)	Procedure for Appointment		659
			Members' Term of Office		660
					661
	C.				661
		` '			661
		2.00			662
	D.		Secretary General and Staff of the Court		663
					663
					663
		(3)	Budget		663
IV.	Th	e Wo	ork of the Court of Auditors		664
	A.	Sco	pe of the Audit		664
		(1)	All Revenue and Expenditure of the Union		664
		(2)	Implementation of the Budget of the Union		666
			(a) Revenue		666
			(b) Expenditure		667
		(3)	The DAS and I management grims on I and W		668
			(a) Reliability of the Accounts	V. The ECE's loyaly ones	668
			(b) Legality and Regularity of the Underlying	Transactions	669
	ъ	, .	(c) The Holy Grail—An unqualified DAS		669
	В.	Aud	it Criteria		670

		(1) The Three Criteria	6/0
		(2) Legality	672
		(3) Irregularity	673
		(4) Timing of the Audit	673
		C. The Court's Audit Powers	673
		(1) General	673
		(2) Institutions	674
		(3) Member States	675
		(4) European Investment Bank	676
		D. Reporting the Audit	676
		(1) Annual Reports	677
		(a) The general budget	677
		(b) The European Development Funds	677
		(c) Specific Annual Reports	678
		(2) Special Reports	678
		(3) Opinions	679
		(a) Mandatory Opinions	679
		(b) Discretionary Opinions	680
	V.	Conclusion	681
		A. Direct Impact	681
		(1) The Discharge Procedure	681
		(2) Legislative Procedure	682
		B. Indirect Impact	682
		C. Constraints	683
		D. Review and Reform	684
		E. The Future	685
		zar aran i Frincisco	
		PART IV: LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE GOVERNANCE	
21	Prir	nary Legislation and Legislative Procedures	689
		cander H. Türk	00)
	I.	Introduction	689
	II.	Concept and Meaning of Union Legislation	691
		Legislative Procedures	693
	111.	A. Initiation of Union Legislation	694
		B. Ordinary Legislative Procedure	698
		(1) First Reading	699
		(2) Second Reading	703
		(3) Third Reading	704
		C. Special Legislative Procedures	705
	TT 7	manufique de la constant de la const	
	IV.	Scope of Union Legislation	706
	V.	Legal Effects of Union Legislation	712
	VI.	Conclusion	715
		124 The company general for blunchlycothese	120
22	ام1	egated and Implementing Acts	716
22.		egated and implementing Acts	/10
	_	l Craig	
	I.	Introduction	716
	II.	The Lisbon Model: Core Assumptions	717
		A. Secondary Norms: Their Centrality and Importance	717

		6. Comitology: The Pre-Lisbon Model 6. Comitology: The Lisbon Model	718 721
	III.	Analytical and Temporal: The Fragile Divide between Articles 290	722
		and 291 TFEU	
		A. The Analytical and Temporal ProblemB. The Relative Use of Article 290 and Article 291: Current Practice	722 729
		C. The Choice between Article 290 and Article 291:	
		Limited Legislative Guidance	731
		D. The Choice between Article 290 and Article 291:	
		Particular Regulatory Schemes	732
		E. The Choice between Article 290 and Article 291: Transitional Issues	733
	IV.	Constitutional: Politics and Constitutional Architecture	734
		A. Constitutional 'Modification': Decision-making under	
		Article 290 TFEU	734
		B. Constitutional 'Modification': The New Schema and	726
		the European Parliament	736
		C. Constitutional 'Modification': Commission and the 'New' Status Quo	738
	V.	Institutional: Agencies, Conferral, Delegated Acts,	
		and Implementing Acts	740
		A. Agencies: Conferral and Delegation	740
		B. ESAs and Delegated Acts	741
		C. ESAs and Implementing Acts	743
	VI.	Legal Form: Hard Law, Soft Law, and Articles 290–291 TFEU	744
	VII.	Conceptual: Rule-making and Adjudication	745
	VIII.	Conclusion	746
23.		ntralized Implementation: European Agencies	748
		rdo Chiti	
	I.	Introduction	748
	II.	Explaining and Conceptualizing the 'Agencification' Process	749
		A. The Proliferation of European Agencies in the 1990s	749
		B. The Explanations Provided by European Legal Scholarship	749
		C. A Different Interpretation: A 'Game of Forces'	751
		D. European Agencies in the 1990s: A Peculiar Component of the EU Administrative System	753
		E. A New Model for the Administrative Implementation of EU Laws	,,,,
		and Policies	755
		F. The 'Agencification' Process in the New Century: Consolidation,	
		Clarification, and Complication	756
	III.	The Agency Model: Distinguishing Features, Shortcomings, Adjustments A. Administrative Integration	758 759
		(1) European Agencies' Internal Organization	759
		(2) The Uneasy Search for Simplification	759
		B. The Relationship with the Commission	760
		(1) Partial Autonomy	760
		(2) Neither Executive Agencies, nor Intergovernmental Bodies,	
		nor Independent Authorities	761
		C. Scientific Independence	762

	(1) The Reasons of Science	762
	(2) The Attempt to Strengthen Scientific Independence vis-à-vis the Market	763
	D. Transnational Polycentrism and European Agencies' Functional Prominence	764
	(1) Sectoral Administrative Networks	764
	(2) The Implications on National Administrations	765
	E. Powers	766
	(1) Mainly Instrumental Powers	766
	(2) Concerns of Procedural and Judicial Protection	767
	F. Accountability	768
	(1) The Gradual Emergence of Accountability Regimes	768
	(2) An Imperfect Development	771
17.7	the Procedure	//-
IV.	The Complication of the Agency Model and the Emergence of a	
	New Type of European Agency	771
	A. From Autonomy to Independence	771
	B. More Incisive Powers	773
V.	Conclusion and add and to granostood these or disconsideral and the	776
Q23	D: The Declarge Procedureds of the great	,,,
24 Th.	O M-d-1-CClii Ob-i Ob-1	777
	Open Method of Coordination: Obstinate or Obsolete?	777
Ker	nneth A. Armstrong	
I.	The OMC as a New Form of EU Governance	779
	A. Origin and Context	779
	B. Defining the OMC	781
	C. What Is the Function of the OMC?	784
	(1) Motivations for Policy Coordination	784
	(2) The Material Dimension of Policy Coordination	787
	() () () () () () () () () ()	788
	(a) Guidelines (b) Indicators, Benchmarks and Targets	789
		791
	(3) The Accountability Dimension	793
	(3) The Accountability Dimension (4) The Temporal Dimension	794
	D. Institutional Authorship and the OMC	795
FER	B. Histitutional Authorship and the OWC	
II.	Law, Legal Principles, and Policy Coordination	797
	A. Legal Principles and the Distribution of Political Authority	798
	(1) The Principles of Conferred Competence and Subsidiarity	799
	(2) Participation, Openness, and Transparency	801
	B. Procedural and Substantive Dimensions of the Rule of Law	802
	(1) Effective Judicial Protection	802
	(2) Fundamental Rights	805
III	0 1 :	807
	Conclusion gardata-resid of standard punds (1 - e) noint bear model transferred (2)	007
25 TI.		000
	Union Budget and the Budgetary Procedure stina Fasone and Nicola Lupo	809
I.	Introduction and the standard of the standard	809
II.	The Union Budget, Still Small Compared to the Union's Ambitious Aims	811
	A. Revenues: The Failure to Introduce Truly Own Resources	814
	B. Expenditures: At the Centre of the Inter-institutional Struggle	
	and Subject to Progressive Diversification	816
		819

III.	The Sources of Law Regulating the Union Budget and	
	the Budgetary Procedure	823
137	Comparison of the contract but and a second of the contract of	825
IV.	The Institutional Dimension of the Budgetary Procedure A. The Multi-annual Financial Framework	825
		828
	B. The Annual Budget after the Treaty of Lisbon (1) The Durfe Budget by the Commission	829
	(1) The Draft Budget by the Commission(2) The Position of the Council	830
	(3) The European Parliament's Role at First Reading: Strengthened	0,50
	or Weakened?	831
	(4) The Conciliation Committee and the Different Outcomes of	051
	the Procedure	833
	(5) From the Centrality of the Annual Budget to the Centrality of	055
	the Amending Budget Acts?	835
	(6) The Signature of the Budget by the President of the	000
	European Parliament and Its Meaning	835
	C. The Implementation and Monitoring of the Budget	837
	D. The Discharge Procedure(s)	839
		037
V.	Conclusion: The Strategic Use of the European Parliament's Budgetary	0.40
	Powers to Increase Its Role: Myth or Reality?	843
26. Sup	ranational Differentiation and Enhanced Cooperation	847
Dan	niel Thym	
I. 284	Introduction SOMO altria autority shed and it is	847
784		
787 II.	The Concept of Differentiated Integration and Its Realization	848
	A. Political Debate	848 848
	(1) Multiple Speeds: Reflection of Economic Differences	849
	(2) Federal Core Europe	851
	(3) Flexibility à la carteB. Pragmatism of the Treaty Regime	852
	i de la comparta del comparta del comparta de la comparta del la comparta de la comparta del la comparta de la	
III.	The Practice of Supranational Differentiation	855
	A. Generic Model: Enhanced Cooperation	855
	(1) Substantive Constraints	856
	(2) Procedural Requirements	858
108	B. Differentiation in Action: Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice	860
	(1) Incorporation of the Schengen Cooperation	860
	(2) Diverse Opt-out Arrangements	862
	(a) Denmark	862
	(b) United Kingdom and Ireland (3) Lishan Tayyarda 'Charry picking'	864
	(5) Lisbon: Towards Cherry-picking	865
	C. Economic and Monetary Union	867
	(1) The Concept of the Treaty of Maastricht	867
	(2) Towards an 'Economic Government' for the Eurozone	869
	D. Limits of Differentiation: Foreign Affairs	870
	(1) CFSP: Benefits of External Uniformity (2) CSDP: Much Noise, Little Impact (So Far)	870
	(2) Gobi. Water Police, Dittle Impact (60 Par)	871 872
	(a) improvement of defence capabilities	873
	(b) Enhanced cooperation and military missions	
IV.	Constitutional Implications	874

	A. Unity of the Legal OrderB. Single Institutional FrameworkC. Cohesion: United in Diversity	874 876 879
	D. Drawbacks for Identity and Legitimacy	880
V.	Conclusion	882
	DART W. HIDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE BU	
	PART V: JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EU	
	icial Review	887
Ali	cia Hinarejos	
I.	Introduction	887
II.	Action for Annulment: Direct Review of EU Measures	888
	A. Reviewable Acts and Time Frame	889
	B. Applicants	890
	(1) Privileged and Semi-privileged Applicants	890
	(2) Non-privileged Applicants	890
	(3) What Are Regulatory Acts?	891
	(4) Regulatory Acts that Do Not Entail Implementing Measures(5) Direct Concern	893
	(6) Individual Concern	895 896
	(7) The Standing of Interest Groups	900
	C. Grounds for Review	900
	(1) Lack of Competence	900
	(2) Infringement of an Essential Procedural Requirement	901
	(3) Infringement of the Treaties or of Any Rule relating to	
	Their Application	903
	(a) Legal Certainty and Legitimate Expectations	903
	(b) Non-discrimination	904
	(4) Misuse of Powers	905
III.	The Plea of Illegality	906
IV.	Interim Relief	908
V.	Consequences of Annulment	908
o VI.	Concluding Remarks	909
5848	em rought firm the cell for the cell for	,0,
28. EU	Liability Actions	910
	minik Hanf	, , ,
I.	Introduction	910
II.		
	Raison d'être and Scope of EU Liability Actions A. EU Liability Action and the Rule of Law	913 913
	P. P. 10 CELLET 11: 4 .	913
	B. Broad Scope of EU Liability Actions (1) An Action Available to Any Person	914
	(2) A Broad Concept of 'Institution'	914
	(3) A Broad Concept of 'Attributable' Conduct	916
	(4) A Broad Concept of the Institutions' 'Conduct'	917
	(5) 'Effet Utile' and Independence of the EU Liability Action	918
	C. Exceptions and 'Grey Areas'	918
	(1) No 'Circumvention' of Other Remedies	919
	(2) Responsibility in Case of Joint Union and National Actions	919

		(3) Subsidiarity of the EU Liability Action in Case of Joint Action? D. Conclusion	920 921
	III.	Substantive Regime of EU Liability	921
		A. No Liability for Lawful Union Conduct	922
		B. Liability for Normative Acts	924
		(1) Reason for Adopting a Restrictive Approach	924
		(2) Functional Understanding of 'Normative Acts'	925
		(3) 'Protectiveness' of the Infringed (Superior) Rule of Law	926
		(4) Seriousness of the Breach	927
		(5) Non-discretionary Normative Acts	928
		C. Liability for Individual Measures	929
		D. The Court's Recast Illegality Test	930
		(1) Focusing on Discretion, Not on the Nature of the Act	930
		(2) Generalizing the 'Serious Breach' Requirement	931
		(3) Consequences	932
		E. Application	932
		F. Causation and Damage	935
		(1) A Direct—and Non-broken—Chain of Causation	935
		(2) An Actual, Certain, Specific, and Quantifiable Damage	937
		G. Conclusion	937
	IV	Concluding Remarks	938
	1 4.	adbot the and to define any to the contract and the	700
20	Enf	orcement Actions	942
4).		Durate Control of the	712
			0/2
	I.	Introduction are also be about the first set of the description of the	942
	II.	Substantive Aspects	944
		A. Nature of the Proceedings	944
		B. Author of the Infringement	945
		(1) National Courts	945
		(2) Private Entities	946
		C. The Infringement	947
		(1) Rules Breached	947
		(2) Member States' Conduct	949
		(3) Transposition of Directives	
		(4) General and Persistent Infringements	952
		D. Member States' Defences	
		(1) Substantive Defences	953
		(2) Force Majeure and Absolute Impossibility	955
		(3) Plea of Illegality	956
	III.	Procedural Aspects	958
		A. The Standard Procedure under Article 258 TFEU	958
		(1) The Informal Stage and EU Pilot	958
		(2) The Administrative Stage	959
		(3) The Litigation Stage	0/1
			961
		(4) Admissibility of the Action	962
		(4) Admissibility of the Action(5) Past Infringements	962 964
		(4) Admissibility of the Action	962

	B. The Procedure under Article 259 TFEU	966
	C. Special Forms of Procedure and Constitution and the Constitution of the Constitutio	967
	D Interim Measures	967
	E. The Role of Private Parties	968
	(1) Relations with Complainants	968
	(2) Transparency and Access to Documents	969
IV.	The Consequences of the Court's Judgments	970
	A. Compliance	970
	B. Member States' Liability	971
	C. Financial Sanctions	972
	(1) The Procedure under Article 260(2) TFEU	972
	(a) Type and amount of sanctions	973
	(2) The Procedure under Article 260(3) TFEU	977
30. Prel	iminary References	981
	ten Broberg and Niels Fenger	
		001
I.	Introduction	981
II.	Which Bodies May Refer?	983
	A. Who May Refer Preliminary Questions?	983
	B. References from Judicial Bodies	984
	C. References from Administrative Authorities and Ombudsmen	986
	D. References from Private Bodies	987
	E. The Phrase 'of a Member State'	987
	F. Other Forms of Preliminary References	988
III.	What Questions May Be Referred?	988
	A. Introduction	988
	B. Article 267(1)(a) on 'the Interpretation of the Treaties'	988
	C. Article 267(1)(b) on 'the Validity and Interpretation of Acts of the	
	Institutions, Bodies, Offices, or Agencies of the Union'	988
	D. Agreements under International Law	989
	E. Questions that Fall Outside the Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice	992
IV.	When Can a Reference for a Preliminary Ruling Be Made?	994
V.	When Must a Reference for a Preliminary Ruling Be Made?	997
	A. The Obligation to Refer	997
	B. National Courts Covered by Article 267(3)	997
	C. Exceptions to the Obligation to Refer	998
	(1) The Question Is Not Relevant	998
	(2) Acte éclairé	999
	(3) Acte clair	999
	(4) Reasons that Do Not Justify Failure to Make Preliminary References	1000
	D. The Obligation of Courts Other than Those of Last Instance to Make	
	a Reference of the state of the	1001
VI.	When Ought a Reference for a Preliminary Ruling Be Made?	1001
VII.	The Form and Content of a Preliminary Reference	1003
VIII		1004

	A Committee to a find a first and the contract of the contract	1004
	A. Overview	1004
	B. Observations on the Preliminary ReferenceC. The Written and the Oral Procedure before the Court of Justice	1005 1005
IX.	The Preliminary Ruling	1006
300	A. Reformulating the Preliminary Question	1006
	B. The Effects of a Preliminary Ruling	1008
	zanomahul sinum tadaka ara ara ana ba	1000
31 Ren	nedies Before National Courts	1011
75.78	thony Arnull	1011
	All of any and a second of the	1011
\$50 I.	Introduction USELL ACTION OF A STATE OF A ST	1011
II.	The Principle of National Procedural Autonomy	1012
	A. Origins	1012
	B. Development	1014
	(1) Effectiveness	1014
	(2) Equivalence	1016
	C. Appraisal	1017
III.	The Principle of Effective Judicial Protection	1019
	A. Origins	1019
	B. Development	1020
	C. The Demise of National Procedural Autonomy?	1023
IV	National Obstacles to the Enforcement of Union Law Rights	1026
18014.	A. Recovering Unlawful Imposts	1026
	B. Time Limits	1028
	C. Interest	1030
	D. Damages	1030
	E. Interim Relief	1031
886		1033
V.	The Relationship between the Court of Justice and	1005
	the Union Legislature	1035
VI.	Conclusion	1038
32. Dar	mages in EU Law	1040
And	lrea Biondi and Martin Farley	
700 I.	Introduction	1040
	THE OCCUPANT OF THE PROPERTY O	
II.	Damages in EU Law: A Snapshot	1041
	A. From Community Liability to State Liability and Back Again	1041
	(1) The Origins	1041
	(2) Il Signor Francovich and Member State Liability	1042
	(3) The Alignment of Liability Conditions	1043
III.	The Importance of Actions for Damages within the EU Legal Order	1043
	A. The CJEU Case Law: Between Federalist Aspirations and Respect for	
	the Rule of Law	1043
	(1) Damages and the EU Constitutional Order	1043
	(2) Damages and Federalist Aspirations	1044
1001	(3) Damages and the Principle of Good Administration	1046
	(4) The Limits of a Symbol: Damages against the Individual	1047
IV.	How Does an Action for Damages against Member States Work?	1048
	A. Non-contractual Liability in Damages against the State	1048

		(1) (2)	EU Law versus National Procedural Law The First Condition: Conferral of Rights for the Protection	1048
			G. The Roserton Particle and the Manner Street Research	1049
			The Second Condition: Serious Breach	1051
		(4)	The Third Condition: Causation	1052
	V.	How	Does an Action for Damages against the EU Work?	1053
			ocedural Rules Governing the Application of Article 340(2) TFEU	1054
			Classical Questions of Admissibility	1054
			Procedural Rules: Independent Form of Action	1056
			Procedural Rules: Which Court Has Jurisdiction?	1056
			bstantive Rules under Article 340(2) TFEU	1058
		(1)	Rules Conferring Rights on Individuals	1058
		(2)	Sufficiently Serious Breach	1058
		(3)	Liability for Lawful Acts	1060
			Causation	1061
		(5)	Damages Demonstrate Demons	1062
	VI	Concl	C. Developmen Conservation and Assen thin Acte wells.	1063
		Conci	The Posionale for Implied Powers	Jil .
		PAR	T VI: THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE UNION	
33.	The	Institu	itional Structure	1067
	Tho	mas Ra	emopoulos and Jan Wouters	
	I.	Introd	luction with a second to the second state of t	1067
	II.	Institu	ntions	1070
		A. Th	e European Council and Its President	1070
		B. Th	e Council	1071
		(1)	Dual Legal Basis of EU Instruments in External Action?	1072
		(2)	Determining the Legal Basis of Legal Instruments in	
			EU External Action	1075
		(3)	The Council and EU Treaty-making: Charting the New Article 218 TFEU	1077
		(6)		1077
			The Foreign Affairs Council and the Political and Security Committee	1085
			Preliminary Concluding Remarks e High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and	1086
			curity Policy and Vice-President of the Commission, and	
			European External Action Service	1086
			Wearing the Hat of the High Representative	1087
			Wearing the Hat of the Vice-President of the Commission	1087
			The European External Action Service and Union Delegations	1090
			e European Commission	1092
			External Representation in the Area of Shared Competences	1093
			Appointment of EU Negotiator of International Agreements	1094
			Representation of the EU in Judicial Proceedings	1096
			e European Parliament	1098
			The Parliament and EU Treaty-making	1098
			The Parliament and Non-CFSP Policies in Union External Action	1100
			The Parliament and the CFSP	1100
			e Court of Justice of the European Union	1101
			The Court and EU Treaty-making	1102

		(2) The Court of Justice and the CFSP: Interpreting Article 40 TEU and Article 275 TFEU	1103
		G. The Rotating Presidency and the Member States	1106
	III.	Conclusion	1108
34.		ernal Competences and the Principle of Conferral	1110
	I.	Introduction	1110
	II.	The Principle of Conferral and Express External Competence A. The Common Commercial Policy (1) Intellectual Property Rights, TRIPs and the CCP (2) Services and the CCP B. The Common Foreign and Security Policy	1113 1114 1114 1116 1117
190		(1) The CFSP, the AFSJ, and Counter-terrorism	1117
		(2) The CFSP and the AFSJ, 'External' and 'Internal' Security	1121
		C. Development Cooperation and Association Agreements	1125
	III.	The Rationale for Implied Powers	1129
	IV.	The Exercise of Competence	1134
	V.	Conclusion	1139
35.		Decision-making Process os Koutrakos	1141
	I.	Introduction	1141
	II.	Treaty-making under Article 218 TFEU	1142
		A. The Definition of International Agreements	1144
		B. Negotiation of International Agreements	1144
		(1) Proposing the Negotiation of International Agreements	1144
		(2) Authorizing the Negotiation of International Agreements	1146
		(3) The Negotiator of International Agreements on Behalf of the EU	1147
		(4) Negotiating International Agreements	1148
		C. Signature and Provisional Application of International Agreements	1153
		D. Conclusion of Agreements	1154
		(1) The Role of the Council	1154
		(a) Agreements Covering a Field for which Unanimity is Required for the Adoption of an EU Act	1154
		(b) Association Agreements	1155
		(c) Agreements on Economic, Financial, and Technical Cooperation	11))
		with Countries which are Candidates for Accession	1155
		(d) Accession of EU to ECHR	1155
		(2) The Role of the European Parliament	1155
		E. Modification of Agreements	1160
		F. Suspension of Agreements	1160
		G. Establishing the EU's Position in a Body Set Up by	
		an International Agreement	1161
	III.	Decision-making in Common Commercial Policy	1161

	IV.	The Significance of Decision-making Procedures	1163
	V.	Decision-making in CFSP and CSDP	1168
		A. Decision-making in CFSP	1169
		B. Decision-making in CSDP	1171
	VI.	Conclusion	1173
26	1.4.	1 A patential Paris Paris Paris I	117/
36.		ed Agreements: The EU Law Fundamentals Heliskoski	1174
	I.	Introduction	1174
	II.	The General Legal Framework	1176
		A. The Rules on Competence: The Rationale and Structure of	5355 SWIFE 1500.
		a Mixed Agreement	1176
		(1) The Limited Scope of Union Competence	1176
		(2) The Non-exclusive Nature of Union Competence	1178
		(3) The Circumscription of Member State Discretion	1180
		(a) The Opinion 2/91 Doctrine	1180
		(b) The Doctrine of Subsidiary, Ancillary, or Incidental Provisions(4) The Rules on Competence as Elements for Typologies	1181
		of Mixed Agreements	1182
		B. The Rules on Obligations of Union Law: The Duty of Loyal Cooperation	1184
	III.	Negotiation, Conclusion, and Application	1185
		A. Negotiation	1185
		B. Signature, Provisional Application, and Conclusion	1188
		(1) The Extent of the Exercise of Union and Member	
		State Competence	1188
		(2) Declarations of Competence	1190
		(3) The Question of Coordination: Incomplete Mixed Agreements	1191
		C. Application (Implementation)	1193
		(1) Acts and Arrangements Governing Implementation	1193
		(2) The Exercise of Union and Member State Competence (3) The Duries of Information Consultation and Abstantian	1194 1196
	13.7	(3) The Duties of Information, Consultation, and Abstention	
	IV.	Jurisdiction of the Court	1198
		A. References for a Preliminary Ruling	1199 1202
		B. Infringement Proceedings	
	V.	The Future	1205
37.		Reception of International Law in the EU Legal Order	1208
	Jan 1	Klabbers	
	I.	Introduction	1208
	II.	Towards a Conceptual Framework	1210
	III.	The Written Constitution	1215
	IV.	EU Trade, Association, and Partnership Treaties	1216
	V.	GATT and WTO Law	1220
	VI.	Other Treaties	1224
	VII.	Customary International Law	1227
	VIII	. Some Treaties of the Member States	1230

IX.	To Conclude: The Cost of Autonomy	1232
	Status in Other International Organizations rt De Baere	1234
		100/
I.	Introduction	1234
II.	EU Membership	1239
	A. The Right to Accession of the Union under EU Law	1239
	B. The Right to Accession of the Union under International Law	1240
	C. The Procedure of Accession under Union Law	1243
	D. The Union and its Member States as Members of an International	
	Organization	1245
	(1) Decision-making in a Body Set Up by an International Agreement	1245
	(2) The Establishment of a Judicial or Dispute Settlement Body	1246
	(3) The Union as a Founding Member: The WTO	1252
	(4) The EU's Membership of a Pre-existing International Organization:	
	The FAO	1255
III.	EU Observer or Equivalent Status in Other International Organizations	1258
	A. Introduction	1258
	B. The Status of the EU at the UN	1259
	C. The Status of the EU at the ILO	1262
	D. The Status of the EU at the IMO	1265
IV	EU Action through Member States	1267
14.	A. The EU at the United Nations Security Council	1267
	B. The EU in International Financial Institutions	1268
	C. The EU at the International Organisation of Vine and Wine	1269
17	and the second of the second o	
V.	Sincere Cooperation	1276
VI.	Conclusion	1280
Index		1283
A I UUUUU		1200