Contents

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| Introduction | xiii |
|---|------|
| Introduction to the Paperback Edition | XXXV |
| PARTONE Political Liberalism: | |
| Basic Elements | |
| LECTURE I. Fundamental Ideas | 3 |
| § 1. Addressing Two Fundamental Questions | 4 |
| § 2. The Idea of a Political Conception of Justice | 11 |
| § 3. The Idea of Society as a Fair System | |
| of Cooperation | 15 |
| § 4. The Idea of the Original Position | 22 |
| § 5. The Political Conception of the Person | 29 |

Contents

| § 6. The Idea of a Well-Ordered Society | 35 |
|--|-----|
| § 7. Neither a Community nor an Association | 40 |
| § 8. The Use of Abstract Conceptions | 43 |
| LECTURE II. The Powers of Citizens and Their Representation | 47 |
| § 1. The Reasonable and the Rational | 48 |
| § 2. The Burdens of Judgment | 54 |
| § 3. Reasonable Comprehensive Doctrines | 58 |
| § 4. The Publicity Condition: Its Three Levels | 66 |
| § 5. Rational Autonomy: Artificial not Political | 72 |
| § 6. Full Autonomy: Political not Ethical | 77 |
| § 7. The Basis of Motivation in the Person | 81 |
| § 8. Moral Psychology: Philosophical not Psychological | 86 |
| LECTURE III. Political Constructivism | 89 |
| § 1. The Idea of a Constructivist Conception | 90 |
| § 2. Kant's Moral Constructivism | 99 |
| § 3. Justice as Fairness as a Constructivist View | 102 |
| § 4. The Role of Conceptions of Society and Person | 107 |
| § 5. Three Conceptions of Objectivity | 110 |
| § 6. Objectivity Independent of the Causal View of Knowledge | 116 |
| § 7. When Do Objective Reasons Exist, Politically Speaking? | 119 |
| § 8. The Scope of Political Constructivism | 125 |
| ART TWO Political Liberalism: Three Main Ideas | 131 |
| LECTURE IV. The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus | 133 |
| § 1. How is Political Liberalism Possible? | 134 |
| § 2. The Question of Stability | 140 |

| | | Content |
|------|--|---------|
| § 3. | Three Features of an Overlapping Consensus | 144 |
| § 4. | An Overlapping Consensus not Indifferent or Skeptical | 150 |
| § 5. | A Political Conception Need not Be Comprehensive | 154 |
| § 6. | Steps to Constitutional Consensus | 158 |
| § 7. | Steps to Overlapping Consensus | 164 |
| § 8. | Conception and Doctrines: How Related | 168 |
| LECT | URE V. Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good | 173 |
| § 1. | How a Political Conception Limits Conceptions of the Good | 174 |
| § 2. | Goodness as Rationality | 176 |
| § 3. | Primary Goods and Interpersonal Comparisons | 178 |
| § 4. | Primary Goods as Citizens' Needs | 187 |
| § 5. | Permissible Conceptions of the Good and Political Virtues | 190 |
| § 6. | Is Justice as Fairness Fair to Conceptions of the Good? | 105 |
| § 7. | The Good of Political Society | 201 |
| § 8. | That Justice as Fairness is Complete | 207 |
| LECT | URE VI. The Idea of Public Reason | 212 |
| | The Questions and Forums of Public Reason | |
| § 2. | Public Reason and the Ideal of Democratic Citizenship | 216 |
| § 3. | Nonpublic Reasons | 220 |
| § 4. | The Content of Public Reason | 223 |
| § 5. | The Idea of Constitutional Essentials | 227 |
| § 6. | The Supreme Court as Exemplar of Public Reason | 231 |
| § 7. | Apparent Difficulties with Public Reason | 240 |
| § 8. | The Limits of Public Reason | 247 |
| | | |

Contents

| PARTT | HREE Institutional Framework | 255 |
|-------|---|-----|
| LECTU | RE VII. The Basic Structure as Subject | 257 |
| § 1. | First Subject of Justice | 257 |
| | Unity by Appropriate Sequence | 259 |
| | Libertarianism Has No Special Role for the Basic Structure | 262 |
| § 4. | The Importance of Background Justice | 265 |
| § 5. | How the Basic Structure Affects Individuals | 269 |
| § 6. | Initial Agreement as Hypothetical and Nonhistorical | 271 |
| § 7. | Special Features of the Initial Agreement | 275 |
| § 8. | The Social Nature of Human Relationships | 278 |
| § 9. | Ideal Form for the Basic Structure | 281 |
| § 10. | Reply to Hegel's Criticism | 285 |
| | | |
| LECTU | RE VIII. The Basic Liberties and Their Priority | 289 |
| § 1. | The Initial Aim of Justice as Fairness | 291 |
| | The Special Status of Basic Liberties | 294 |
| § 3. | Conceptions of Person and Social Cooperation | 299 |
| § 4. | The Original Position | 304 |
| § 5. | Priority of Liberties, I: Second Moral Power | 310 |
| § 6. | Priority of Liberties, II: First Moral Power | 315 |
| § 7. | Basic Liberties not Merely Formal | 324 |
| § 8. | A Fully Adequate Scheme of Basic Liberties | 331 |
| § 9. | How Liberties Fit into One Coherent Scheme | 334 |
| § 10. | Free Political Speech | 340 |
| § 11. | The Clear and Present Danger Rule | 348 |
| § 12. | Maintaining the Fair Value of Political Liberties | 356 |
| § 13. | Liberties Connected with the Second Principle | 363 |
| § 14. | The Role of Justice as Fairness | 368 |

| | Contents |
|--|----------|
| LECTURE IX. Reply to Habermas | 372 |
| § 1. Two Main Differences | 373 |
| § 2. Overlapping Consensus and Justification | 385 |
| § 3. Liberties of the Moderns Versus the Will of the People | 396 |
| § 4. The Roots of the Liberties | 409 |
| § 5. Procedural Versus Substantive Justice | 421 |
| § 6. Conclusion | 433 |
| PART FOUR The Idea of Public Reason Revisited | 435 |
| Introduction to "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited" | 437 |
| The Idea of Public Reason Revisited (1997) | 440 |
| | |
| Original Index | 491 |
| Index to the New Material | 521 |
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